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INTRODUCTION:
DEVELOPMENT

863

THE DILEMMA OF PARTICIPATION IN

The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one
is against it in principle because it is good for you.1

Since the advent of federally-sponsored urban development, the federal government has sought to facilitate decentralized decision-making by local governments. 2 While the geographical proximity oflocal government makes it best suited to
determine the types of local development activities and the
manner of execution of such local projects, federal programs
have nevertheless strongly encouraged local governments to
include community participation in the development decisionmaking process. 3 AB a result, the federal push for decentralization has involved both a release of power and a limited command: a devolution of development decision-making power to
local governments with a requirement to involve local
citizens-residents and proponents of inner-city neighborhoods
that are typically poor and, more often than not, black.
Participation evokes notions of democracy, egalitarianism,
and inclusion and, as the introductory quotation illustrates, it
is easy to support in principle. Any citizen is theoretically
eligible to share his or her views about the shape, pace, and
location of a development project through a variety of participatory methods, such as public meetings, focus groups, adviso1 Sherry Arnstein, Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation, in
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: A CASEBOOK IN DEMOCRACY 335, 337 (Edgar S. Cahn &
Barry A. Passett eds., 1970).
2 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949).
3 The antecedents for federally encouraged citizen participation extend back to
when Congress chartered chambers of commerce in 1912 to learn about the views
of the business community. In the 1930s, the Department of Agriculture developed
locally elected county and community committees of farmers to create a more
direct relationship between the federal government and farmers and allow the Department to adapt federal grants-in-aid to local needs. See United States Advisory
Commission on IntergoveI'I)IIlental Relations, Citizen Participation in the American
Federal System 110 (1979); see also Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, §
105(d), 63 Stat. 413, 417 (requiring citizen participation through public hearings);
Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 560, § 221(a)(1), 68 Stat. 590, 600 (1954) (making citizen participation a mandated element of the "workable program for community improvement" for those communities or localities that requeste.d provision of
mortgage insurance).
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ry committees, or community charrettes. But participation is
often less easy to support in practice because of its structural
disconnect with urban development. Participation relies on
contrastingly radical precepts of direct democracy-the views
of a collection of non-professional, non-expert, and potentially
disruptive citizens are to be included in a legally technical and
logistically complicated development process that usually depends heavily on training and expertise. Moreover, precepts of
community participation dictate that people who are of different class, race, education, status, and socioeconomic backgrounds shall work together in an open decision-making pro, cess. People who are interested in a neighborhood for the profit
to be made are supposed to work together with people who are
only concerned about the quality of life in the neighborhood. At
a minimum, a participatory development process envisioned as
collaborative, synergistic, and inclusive can also potentially
mean delay, disruption, and perceptions of wasted time.
This disconnect between principle and practice has been
reflected over time and over the variety of federal urban development initiatives to revitalize inner cities that have mandated
community participation.4 The types of participatory mechanisms have varied, however, in an ebb and flow of contrastingly strong and weak mandates for participation. This ebb
and flow of federally-mandated participation is particularly
striking because neither strong nor weak provisions have resulted in participation that has been uniformly satisfactory to
individual citizens, communities, or local governments. At least
one, some, or all are dissatisfied. The failures are often attributed to problems with inadequate funding or implementation
or an impolitic violation of political federalism by inappropriately attempting to closely manage local participatory processes at the federallevel. 5 This Article argues that the problem is
not implementational or lack of federal respect for local control. Rather, the problem is at once rhetorical, normative, and
structural.

• For instance, Urban Renewal, Community Action, Demonstration Cities,
Community Development Block Grant, and Empowerment Zones. See supra Part 1.
5 See, e.g., Barlow Burke, Jr., The Threat to Citizen Participation in Model
Cities, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 751, 775 (1971) (attributing the failures of citizen
participation in the Model Cities Program to lack of vision and direction of federal
government's bureaucratically complex management of the program).
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Part I of this Article describes the ebb and flow of federal
participatory mandates between strong and weak mandates for
participation, all of which have been dissatisfying or unproductive. Part II picks up where federal mandates have left off by
examining the three dominant sets of justifications for participation in the context of the elite-dominated and privatized
process of urban development. Part II then considers the extent to which each type of explanation convincingly justifies
the often time-consuming processes and conflict inherent in
community participation. The justifications, which I characterize as instrumental, democratic, and empowerment, make
broad claims about the benefits and purposes of participation.
This Article argues, however, that the familiar instrumental or
efficiency-based justifications for participation, as well as democratic or process-based justifications, are inadequate, standing
alone, to justify or explain the importance of community participation in development. Instead, empowerment theories that
explicitly connect participation to a redistribution of decisionmaking power are an important yet overlooked aspect of the
basis for community participation in development. These theories recognize that given the exclusive and privatized nature of
the development decision-making process, including representatives of poor urban communities (communities that have
been racialized black and classified poor) entails an act of
resistance to the nature of economic development that is currently directed exclusively towards meeting the interests of the
middle class and the wealthy. I then argue for a way to reconcile the three theories to provide the best justification for participation, as well as to discuss the substantive choices that
must be made to make participatory mandates meaningful.
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The road to economic opportunity and community development
starts with broad participation by all segments of the community .... Communities that stand together are communities that can
rise together.6

I.

THE EBB AND FLOW OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE
LOCAL COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The above-quoted statement seems an inspiring indication
of the federal government's commitment to the right of participation for poor community residents in urban economic
development. Or is it? On closer examination, what exactly
does the statement mean? Notions of decentralized decisionmaking, local control, and community involvement come to
mind. In some ways the federal government is demonstrating
great deference and respect for local geographies while also
attempting to reconfigure the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in development at the local level. But crucial questions
remain unanswered: How broad should broad participation be?
To what end? On what decisions? Why should all segments of
the community be involved in a complicated, technical, largely
legal and financial process that is usually handled by business
and government elites?7 How does collective community action
lead to improved economic opportunity? For whom? Where did
this idea come from?
Participation has to be understood within the context of
the history of urban development programs in the United
States. Urban development has been an ongoing local governmental project of creating a functioning and productive city by
planning, financing, and developing a variety of commercial
and residential facilities, amenities, and uses of land. Beginning in the late 19308 and 1940s, the emphasis was on the

6 U.S. DEP'T OF HOus. AND URBAN DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES: TOGETHER.
APPLICATION FORMS FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES 4
(1994).
1 See Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 351 (1999) ("The current geography of economic development is one in which economic development is designed
and intended to be carried out in particular ways in particular places: privately
and exclusively in central business districts on the other side of the line demarcating the difference between the inner city and the rest of the city.").
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elimination of slums in cities to improve quality of life for
those residents while also promoting the overall economic
health of the city by making it an attractive place for middleclass residents.8 Today, the articulated rationale for redevelopment is more directly and explicitly economic development.9
That rationale is consistent, however, with what urban development always has been and meant in the United States. In
either case, the goal is the same: to facilitate the social and
economic well-being of urban citizens.
While the federal government has sought to encourage the
private sector actors to take the lead in initiating and planning
development,10 federal legislation has also endeavored since
at least the 1950s to get cities to include affected residents in
the process of development decision-making. l l In some ways
this is a reflection of the impact of the Administrative Procedures Act/2 through which the federal government attempted
to make federal rule-making accessible to citizens who care to
have a role in shaping the outcome of implementing regulations. Continuing in that tradition, programs as diverse as
urban renewal, housing development, and transportation funding have included citizen or community participation requirements to ensure that the process of project identification,
programmatic priorities, and implementation allows for some
democratic participation by ordinary citizens. 13 Therefore, the

See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, tit. I, 63 Stat. 413, 414-21.
See, e.g., Louise A Howells, Looking for the Butterfly Effect: An Analysis of
Urban Economic Development under the Community Development Block Grant Pro·
gram, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 383, 390 (1997) (critiquing CDBG's effectiveness as an economic development program).
10 In comparison, European approaches have been more centralized and state
directed. Increasingly, however, England has attempted more privatized approaches
to what they term "urban regeneration." Susan Fainstein, Urban Development, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING 614, 615 (Willem van Vliet ed., 1998).
II See Burke, supra note 5, at 751-55 (discussing the history of citizen participation in federal programs since the 1930s).
12 These administrative processes began with public hearing requirements and
evolved into comment procedures. The rules governing these processes are detailed,
numerous, and cumbersome. At the federal level, they have been criticized for
mandating rule-making processes that are monopolized by professional interest
groups (which are typically the only ones with the sustained interest and resources to keep track of detailed and often tedious rule making sessions) rather than
involving ordinary citizens. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of
Mass Participation, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 175 n.5 (1997).
13 Citizen participation requirements are also contained in many other block
8

9
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proliferation of participation as an accepted aspect of local
planning and decision-making is due largely to the federal
government. Today, the inclusion of participatory mechanisms
in local decision-making is an accepted cornerstone practice in
the field of land use planning and development and environmental management. 14 The potential benefit is the extent to
which such participatQry procedures encourage localities to
take into account the interests of groups that are typically excluded from political or planning processes. While there are
many success stories, the record of the grand federal initiatives
for participation in development has been, at best, mixed. I5
A. Modern Participation and the Rubber Stamp

The first experience with massive urban redevelopment in
the United States arose out of the Housing Act of 1949's (the
"1949 Act") Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal program. IS
This program provided funding for cities on a per project basis
for locally generated plans for demolishing slums and renovatgrant programs. Participation requirements mandated in the Local Crime Prevention Block Grant Program passed as part of the Safe Streets Act of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 13756 (2000). See RAYMOND SHAPEK, MANAGING FEDERALISM: THE EvOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM 190-201 (1981). A number
of other categorical programs require public participation in the policy formulation
process. See, e.g., The Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 128 (2000); The Elementary and Secondary School Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6319 (a)(1) (2000). Both Acts require
public participation in the state spending of federal grant monies. The goal is
often to get local governments to plan regionally with other areas whose interests
might be affected by the grants.
14 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (2000). A few cities are even beginning to include
community participation components in their zoning practices and even legislation.
See, e.g., City of Glendale, Arizona, Citizen Participation Ordinance (requiring persons requesting a zoning change that requires a public hearing to first prepare
and implement a citizen participation plan that must involve informing and providing an opportunity to discuss the proposed changes in advance of the public
hearing). See generally Margaret A. Moote et al., Theory in Practice: Applying Participatory Democracy Theory to Public Land Planning, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 877 (presenting a case study of Bureau of Land Management utilization of a more participatory method of public land use management).
15 In one sense, it might be accurate to use the word disappointing instead of
mixed. But there have been indirect benefits from past participatory experiences
apart from whether or not the participatory mechanism worked in a particular
federal program. See infra note 39 (discussing the role that the Great Society programs played in providing employment as well as urban political power in Northern cities during the late 1960s and early 1970s).
16 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949).
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ing blighted areas "to improve the urban environment, to keep
middle class residents and reduce the flight of high income
taxpayers to the suburbs."17 The approach was to facilitate
such redevelopment by removing certain market and property
ownership obstacles to updated uses of urban land. IS The typical urban renewal program involved designating an area as
blighted, preparing a development plan, holding a public hearing, exercising the power of eminent domain (typically by a
redevelopment authority) to assemble parcels ofland for development, physically clearing and bulldozing the land, and marketing the cleared land to potential developers. 19 Urban renewal is less remembered for its claimed successes than for its
conspicuous failures. The fundamental flaw of urban renewal
was that it incorrectly assumed that private redevelopment
would occur if land that had been declared blighted was
cleared and made available for development. 2o This flawed
assumption had a devastatingly and irreparable impact: the
designation of blighted areas destroyed many stable neighborhoods and displaced the low-income residents who were, more
often than not, black. 21 Relocation assistance was minimal for
property owners and nonexistent for renters. Residents were
displaced into other neighborhoods that then became over-

17 MANuEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 102 (1983). Herbert
Gans, writing at the time, observed that urban renewal "cleared slums to make
room for many luxury-housing and a few middle-income projects, and . . . also
provided inexpensive land for the expansion of colleges, hospitals, libraries, [and]
shopping areas." Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 539 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
18 C. Theodore Koebel, Center for Hous. Research, Va. Polytechnic Inst. and

State Univ., Urban Redevelopment, Displacement, and the Future of the American
City 7-8 (1996).
19 See Martin A Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 17, at 492-93. See generally MARTIN
ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL
1949-1962 (1964).
20 One problem, for example, was that the cleared land might be undesirable
for development because it was still surrounded by slums. Gans, supra note 17, at
542.
21 Gans, supra note 17, at 538-39. According to Anderson, two-thirds were
Black or Puerto Rican. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 65; see also Charles F. CaseyLeininger, Making the Second Ghetto in Cincinnati: Avondale, 1925-70, in RACE
AND THE CITY: WORK, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST IN CINCINNATI, 1820-1970, at 232,
242 (Henry Louis Taylor, Jr. ed., 1993) (describing how urban renewal was used
in support of deliberate policies to racially segregate neighborhoods).

870

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

IVol. 66: 3

crowded and also deteriorated. 22 Declaring a neighborhood
blighted was also a self-fulfilling prophecy-it hastened deterioration by removing any incentive that property owners, who
knew their property was going to be acquired, had to maintain
the property.23
The Housing Act of 195424 (the "1954 Act") amended the
1949 Act to add rehabilitation as a goal in addition to development. The 1954 Act contained a modest community participation requirement: each city was supposed to COPle up with a
"workable program" for urban renewal. 25 Citizen boards were
convened but were often hastily assembled advisory committees that had a token representative of the communities (mostly poor, mostly black) on the board.26 This representative most
often simply provided a "rubber stamp," legitimating urban
redevelopment decisions that had already been made by the
local government. Therefore, very little meaningful participation in important redevelopment decisions by either ordinary
citizens or residents of the affected neighborhoods took
place.27 Participation with little meaning had an unintended
consequence, however. While urban renewal is widely under-

Gans, supra note 17, at 539.
Koebel, supra note 18, at 8-9.
2' Housing Act of 1954, Rehabilitation & Neighborhood Conservation Housing
Insurance provisions, Pub. L. No. 560, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590, 596-603 (1954)
(amending the 1949 Act to provide incentives for rehabilitation as well as demoli•
tion).
25 The guidelines consisted of a pamphlet concerned that the form and extent
of citizen participation would vary from locality to locality. The guidelines recommended, among other things, that cities use a citizen's advisory committee "con_
sisting of prominent citizens appointed by the mayor." U.S. Housing and Home
Finance Agency, How Localities Can Develop a Workable Program for Urban Re·
newal 10-11 (Mar. 1955). The guidelines further advised, "Opportunity to participate should be available to all neighborhood interests so that there is full understanding of the program by occupants of the affected city blocks. Those affected by
the program should have an opportunity not only to be informed but to express
their views, fears, or apprehensions." ld.; see also Charles F. Casey-Leininger,
Planning Community Control and the Persistent Ghetto in Cincinnati, 1956-1980
(1995) (unpublished), at http://comm-org.utoledo.edulpapers96/casey-Ieininger.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (discussing Cincinnati's "workable program" as a process of seeking meritorious suggestions).
26 See generally Arthur R. Simon, New Yorkers Without a Voice: A Tragedy of
Urban Renewal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Apr. 1966) (providing firsthand account of the
ineffective attempts by poor residents to participate in and impact the outcome of
a New York City urban renewal program).
27 ld.
22
23
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stood to be a program originally designed to help restore cities
that contributed instead to their decline,28 urban renewal is
ironically noteworthy for another contribution. Urban renewal
may have been partially responsible for galvanizing local communities and policymakers to understand the importance of
including meaningful measures for citizen participation in
future urban development programs.29

B. Power to the People: Community Participation "Back in the
Day"
During the 1960s, the federal government declared a "War
on Poverty" and adopted a number of social service and development programs containing relatively strong participatory
requirements to address the problems of black poverty in
northern city ghettos. 3o The inspiration for a strong participatory mandate in federal War on Poverty (also coined "the
Great Society") programs stemmed from a privately funded,
precursor program, the Gray Areas program. This program

28 Koebel, supra note 18, at 9. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER
BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1974).
29 See Susan S. Fainstein & Clifford Hirst, Neighborhood Organizations and
Community Planning: The Case and Context of the Minneapolis Experience, in
REVITALIZING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 96-111 CW. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1996)
("Federal requirements for increased resident participation in redevelopment planning arose from the backlash from neighborhood destruction in early planning
efforts."). At the time, James Q. Wilson observed:
The growth of neighborhood resistance to urban renewal has been gradual and cumulative. Many of the earliest redevelopment projects were
completed with little organized opposition. Somehow, however, people
have learned from the experience of others and today, in cities which
have been engaged in renewal for several years, the planners often find
prospective renewal areas ready and waiting for them, organized to the
teeth.
James Q. Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal,
in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 17, at 409.
Arguably, the experience with the 1956 interstate highway program and its destruction of poor neighborhoods also played a role. See generally KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1985).
30 The War on Poverty was originally described as an "anti-riot" bill by the
New York Times. JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 222-23 (1990). See generally
Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
L.J. 1317 (1964).
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was one of the first to conceive of the problems of blacks in
poor communities as being a problem of "place" rather than
race-racial discrimination and segregation. Instead, the program sought to promote assimilation of poor black ghetto residents into the mainstream of society and the economy by,
among other things, strengthening inner-city neighborhoods as
communities. 31 The program mainly attempted to improve
services in these neighborhoods by utilizing a strong notion of
participation. Residents would be guided to help themselves by
participating in community affairs. It was hoped that the process of participation would strengthen the local community and
the participant as well as create pressure for improved services
for ghetto residents. 32 While the origins of this approach were
largely theoretical and untested, they made a significant contribution to the belief in community participation mandates.
They failed, however, to provide much guidance on how to approach the endeavor.
One of the key programs of the War on Poverty was the
Economic Opportunity Act's "Community Action Program"
("Community Action"). Community Action adopted the Gray
Areas program's idea of participation by residents in the provision of services. Focused on improving social service delivery in
the areas of nutrition, employment, and welfare,33 the Community Action required "maximum feasible participation of the
poor" in the program.34 This provision was overlooked during
congressional debates over the bill and thus there is little, if
any, legislative history explaining its goal or purpose. It became an issue, however, when mayors attempted to organize
community action boards that were packed with the usual
array of public officials and civic leaders. In response, many
black communities organized and demanded authority over the
program's priorities and decision-making.35 Citizens in many

31 ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (1995).
32

Id.

Nicholas LeMann, The Unfinished War, 262 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 37, 37, 49
(1988).
34 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 2701) (repealed Pub. L. 97-35, tit. VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519
(1981».
3S See MORONE, supra note 30, at 230-31.
33
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cities also took the opportunity to speak out on a broad range
of issues, including unpopular urban renewal projects and poor
city services.3s In so doing, they forced a more direct response
to poverty than originally contemplated by the Community
Action program-new services.37
A good part of Community Action's focus became participation itself. Hundreds of independent local organizations (community action agencies) were created to coordinate a variety of
service programs including "neighborhood services, education,
health, manpower, housing, social services, and economic development."38 There were protracted struggles over board
composition and representation on the boards of community
action agencies to establish the meaning of participation.39
These conflicts exposed all of the underlying structural conflicts in the participatory mandate: What was the meaning of
participation? Who should be represented on the boards? How
should representatives be selected? How much decision-making
authority and power should they have?'o From the city
government's point of view, the mayor should control the poverty programs and formulate policy with black representatives
as advisers or in salaried sub-professional roles. 41 From the

MORONE, supra note 30, at 236.
See MORONE, supra note 30, at 220-21 (describing the indirect approach to
poverty contemplated by the Community Action program's precursor, the Gray
Areas Program which sought to remedy municipal agency failure to coordinate).
38 See HALPERN, supra note 31, at 108.
39 The War on Poverty, arguably, channeled the political energy of the movement from struggle over relatively general concepts like "shared power," "freedom,"
or integration to seemingly more concrete battles over the terms of their participation in the War on Poverty boards. MORONE, supra note 30, at 226-27. Community
Action Agencies are widely recognized, however, as the agents of integration of
blacks into local politics and government. HALPERN, supra note 31, at 109-10;
MORONE, supra note 30, at 248. But see Jacqueline Pope, The Colonizing Impact of
Public Service Bureaucracies in Black Communities, in RACE, POLITICS AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 141 (James Jennings ed., 1992).
<0 An early task force announced that maximum feasible participation meant at
least one representative from each neighborhood served by the agency. MORONE,
supra note 30, at 230. By the spring of 1965, the required number that was to be
chosen by democratic techniques had expanded to "roughly one third" of the
agency's governing board. MORONE, supra note 30, at 230. In some cities black
leaders demanded control over the local CAAs, succeeding in about twenty cities.
HALPERN, supra note 31, at 109. In 1966, Congress sought to clarify the definition
of participation and amended the Economic Opportunity Act to require that onethird of each CAA board be made up of representatives of the poor. Id. at 109-10.
<I MORONE, supra note 30, at 229.
36

37
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community perspective, they should have control of the expenditure of social service and development dollars in their communities. In the early days of the program, the federal
government's Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO") accepted
the role of arbiter in the conflicts and often sided with local
groups that sought more participation.42
This mobilization and organization backed by the federal
government upset the political balance in cities around the
country. In fact, the most significant aspect of the Community
Action approach to social services and participation of poor
residents was that it initially provided for direct funding of
Community Action Agencies, thus bypassing state and local
governments. This was "widely regarded by local politicians as
funding black political opposition right on their turf' and was
subsequently eliminated.43
The urban development component of the War on Poverty
was the Model Cities program. 44 The purpose of the Model
Cities program, as stated by Congress, was "to provide additional financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all
sizes . . . to plan, develop and carry out locally prepared and
scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs . . . .'>45
The Model Cities program was intended to address the prob-

42 MORONE, supra note 30, at 230; see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Rebuilding the
Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation, Community Action, Metros, and One ?Jan-One Vote, 58 GEO. L.J. 955, 958-62 (1970) (discussing OEO and HUD's role in experimenting with various techniques of citizen
participation).
43 See LeMann, supra note 33, at 54.
44 See Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-754, SO Stat. 1255, 1261-66 (referring to planned metropolitan development)
(formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3313 omitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000) due
to termination of authority to make grants and loans under this subchapter after
Jan. 1, 1975); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, tit. II, 78
Stat. 508, 516-20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (referring
to "Urban and Rural Community Action Programs"). Many environmental statutes
passed during the 1970s and 1980s also contained significant enhanced opportunities for participation in agency decision-making. See, e.g., National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994) (providing for public participation in preparation of Environmental Impact Statements); Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994, Supp. IV 1998) (providing for oral legislativelike hearings).
45 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-754, tit. I, § 101; 80 Stat. 1255 (1966). This language is also found at 42
U.S.C. § 3301 (2000).
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lems of the physical infrastructure within ghetto neighborhoods and demonstrate that urban development could also be
inclusive of the poor.46 It attempted to link social services and
job training to housing and physical community development
activity in target "model" inner-city neighborhoods in a limited
number of cities.47
Cities interested in obtaining a Model Cities grant had to develop an
elaborate plan for revitalizing the neighborhood ... developed by a
newly created body called a City Demonstration Agency composed of
elected officials, representatives of major agencies (e.g., schools,
housing authorities, health, welfare, employment), labor, and business leaders."(S

The program instead provided for "widespread citizen participation.'>49 Paradoxically, this provision was intended to mini-

The prologue declared:
[I)mproving the quality of urban life is the most critical domestic problem
facing the United States. The persistence of widespread urban slums and
blight, the concentration of persons of low income in older urban areas,
and the unmet needs for additional housing and community facilities and
services arising from rapid expansion of our urban population have resulted in a marked deterioration in the quality of the environment and
the lives of large numbers of our people while the Nation as a whole
prospers.
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, "Comprehensive
City Demonstration Programs," Findings & Declaration of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 89754, tit. I, § 101, 80 Stat. 1255. The language can also be found at 42 U.S.C. §
3301 (2000).
47 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 121. See generally Otto J. Hetzel & David E.
Pinsky, Urban Deuelopment Symposium, The Model Cities Program, 22 VAND. L.
REv. 727 (1969).
48 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 121. See generally Robert A. Aleshire, Power to
the People: An Assessment of the Community Action and Model Cities Experience,
32 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 428 (1972); Katherine A. Hinckley, The Bang and the Whimper: Model Cities and Ghetto Opinion, 13 URB. AFF. Q. 131 (Dec. 1977); Special
Project: Nashville Model Cities: A Case Study, 25 VAND. L. REv. 727 (1972).
49 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-754, tit. I, § 101, 80 Stat. 1255. This language is also found at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3303(a)(2). The basic philosophy of the Act was stated by the then newly established Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). HUD stated that
"improving the quality of life of the residents of a model neighborhood can be
accomplished only by the affirmative action of the people themselves. This requires
a means of building self-esteem, competence and a desire to participate effectively
in solving the social and physical problems of their community." North City AreaWide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 456 F.2d 811, 813 n.5 (3d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter
Romney III (quoting Department of Housing and Urban Development, City Demonstration Agency Letter No. 3 (Oct. 30, 1967».
46
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mize the level of neighborhood participation in comparison to
what had taken place under the Community Action program.
The Community Action program illustrated the difficulties
of governmental coordination of the technical planning aspects
of development, along with unanticipated or unstructured community involvement or contro1. 50 The Model Cities program
was the first attempt to remedy the perceived excesses of Community Action's participatory mechanisms. The participatory
mechanisms in the Model Cities program were structured in a
way that attempted to minimize the level of participation. In
contrast to Community Action's mandate of maximum feasible
participation of the poor, Model Cities contained a general requirement of "widespread citizen participation"51 but attempted to minimize participation by channeling funding of development through state and local governmental agencies instead of
directly' to community groupS.52 Therefore, development could
take place with the appropriate level of participation-in consultation with neighborhood residents in program planning
and governance. But, because black ghetto communities were
relatively organized in a number of cities, the existing federal
procedures, while minimal, and the relatively close oversight
gave procedural entree to communities that wanted to protest
or litigate. For example, in most cities, plans were prepared by
City Hall before neighborhood residents could mobilize, indeed,
before they were aware that a new program was being

50 According to Morone, the idea of community focused efforts of self-empowerment was "redolent with implicit threat to established power relations and full
of promise to the black communities that were struggling for a way to break into
them." MORONE, supra note 30, at 222.
51 The Demonstration Cities Act directed the Secretary to "emphasize local initiative in the planning, development, and implementation" of local programs to
insure "prompt response to local initiative" on the part of the federal government
and to ensure that all Model City plans provide for "widespread citizen participation in the program." Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
1966, § 103(b)(l)-(2), 80 Stat. at 1257.
52 See Thomas J. Oliver, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, Application of
"Model Cites" Provisions of Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act
of 1966, as Amended (42 U.S.CoA §§ 3301-3313), 10 AL.R. FED. 802, 808 (1967)
("The Model Cities Act requires participation by area residents both in the planning and in the implementation of a model cities program, although it has been
recognized that such participation is required only in the sense of consultation
with government officials, rather than in the sense of a citizen veto or approval
power.").
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planned.53 Nonetheless, when residents did learn of program
plans, many inner-city neighborhoods, educated by their experiences with Community Action, were already organized to
react quickly to their exclusion from the planning process.
"When they did react, they discovered that they were able to
tie up planning or program monies from HUD to a particular
city, in turn providing further impetus for them to demand a
role in the program."54 As a result of demands by community
activists working for political empowerment through self-determination of local neighborhoods, later Model Cities programs
provided a process to ensure a role for local communities in
defining their problems and goals.55 It also provided a blueprint for the consequences of excluding citizen participation.
Citizens would resort to their remaining avenue of redress-obstruction, protest, and litigation.
1. Litigating to Enforce Participation: Too Little Too Late

While a few groups attempted to use litigation to vindicate
unfulfilled participation goals, litigation often took too long
and, even on the rare occasion of a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, accomplished little. For example, one of the cases
involving a successful challenge to a citizen participation
scheme, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney,56 illustrates that litigation often produces, at best, mixed results.
Romney arose out of the City of Philadelphia's proposed Model
Cities program. The city applied for a grant that proposed to
use a coalition organization comprised of a combination of local
organizations, the North City Area-Wide Council ("AWC"), as
its citizen participation arm. 57 AWC's participatory activities
would include conducting program planning, evaluation, and
operation. 58 HUD subsequently informed all cities by letter
53 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 122; see also Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350 .
•, HALPERN, supra note 31, at 122. See generally Romney II, 456 F.2d 811 (3d
Cir. 1972). Arnstein noted that citizens were "enraged by previous forms of alleged
participation [and) refused to be 'conned' again. They threatened to oppose the
awarding of a planning grant to the city. They sent delegations to HUD in Washington. They used abrasive language. Negotiations took place under an cloud of
suspicion and anger." Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350.
5S HALPERN, supra note 31, at 185.
56 Romney II, 456 F.2d 811 (3rd Cir. 1972).
57 Id. at 814.
58 The City's application concluded that the two basic causes for the conditions
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that citizen participation groups should only engage in program planning and evaluation but were prohibited from "operating" a Model Cities program.59 HUD administrators then
indicated to Philadelphia that its Model Cities plan would be
rejected if the plan continued to utilize AWC's services as a
program operator. 60 The concern was that a conflict of interest
would result from one entity planning and evaluating a program that it also operated.61 Representatives of the AWC objected strongly to their exclusion from program operation.62
They requested extra time, however, to consult with their constituents about the exclusion of operations from participation63 While AWC was seeking input from constituents, the
city administrator for the program amended the citizen participation plan to exclude the AWC as the citizen participation
arm of the Philadelphia program because time was of the essence to meet a HUD deadline.64 AWC brought a class-action
suit claiming the City's and HUD's actions were in violation of
the Demonstration Cities Act's citizen participation requirements. 65 Initially dismissed on summary judgment, the litigation ensued over the next three years, terminating in a successful decision on the merits for AWC in 1972.66 On the sec-

in the target area are poverty and powerlessness and, therefore, a central aim of
the Philadelphia Program was to provide Model Cities residents with an opportunity to participate fully in City decisions affecting the target area and to assume
some control over their own economic resources. North City Area-Wide Council,
Inc. v. Romney, 399 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1971) !hereinafter Romney 1].
The background to this application is interesting. One account reads as follows:
Philadelphia wrote its . . . application and waved it at a hastily called
meeting of community leaders. When those present were asked for an
endorsement, they angrily protested the city's failure to consult them on
preparation of the extensive application. . .. [Instead, at) their next
meeting, citizens handed the city officials a substitute citizen participation section that changed the ground rules from a weak citizen's advisory
role to a strong shared power agreement. Philadelphia's application to
HUD included the citizens' substitution word for word.
Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350.
59 Romney II, 456 F.2d at 815.
60 Id. at 816.
61 Id. at 815.
62 Id. at 817.
63 Id. at 816.
6' Romney II, 456 F.2d at 816-17.
65 Id. at 812.
66 Id. at 818.
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ond of two appeals, the Third Circuit held that the exclusion of
AWC was in violation of the participatory provisions of the
Model Cities Act and implementing regulations.67 The court
ordered the community group reinstated in the Model Cities
process.68 The legal victory failed, however, to garner much
for the organization or the community it represented. While
the litigation was pending, the planning and implementation of
the program in Philadelphia had gone on without the required
participatory groUp.69 Although Philadelphia was ordered to
and did replace the existing illegal board, there was probably
little left to decide and less to implement.
The issues in Romney were at once factual and legal. The
court's task was to determine if the legally required standard
for citizen participation had been met: at a minimum, had the
proper amount of participation taken place. This required the
court to interpret HUD's vague statutory language and HUD's
numerous contradictory attempts to clarify the policy. The
standard of legally required participation the court seemed to
arrive at was "consultation." Even though the program had
subsequently proceeded with an independent citizen group in
place, the issue was what weight the court should give to the
failure to consult with the original participatory organization
about the proposed elimination of "operations" from an approved participatory scheme. The court of appeals chose to
enforce the participatory mandate in a manner intended to
discourage cities from using similar maneuvers to exclude or
bypass legitimate citizen representatives for potentially more
pliable or less challenging substitutes. From both the
community's and the city's standpoint, however, the court's
decision probably represented an unwelcome or disruptive
intrusion of the dictates of process in an already process-laden
endeavor. Thus, the Romney case illustrates the problem of
using litigation to vindicate unfulfilled participatory goals.
More importantly, however, it also probably served as a cautionary tale for legislators on how not to structure a participatory process. Explicitly stated rights of appeal or enforcement
mean delay. Since Romney and the Model Cities and Commu-

67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Romney II, 456 F.2d at 818.
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nity Action experiences, participatory provisions have been
structured to eliminate any legally enforceable participatory
mandates. Participatory provisions are usually drafted without
any language that could be interpreted as guaranteeing an
enforceable right to participation. As a result, later participatory provisions that have followed the Community Action and
Model City era, such as those in the Community Development
Block Grant and the Empowerment Zone programs,70 have
never included language that could ever serve as an enforceable mandate in court. While this has served as a pragmatic
limit on frivolous litigation for leverage by disgruntled or dissatisfied community participation advocates, it has also meant
that citizens have been relatively powerless to enforce participatory mandates that are ignored by local government or that
fail to provide citizens with a meaningful voice for their needs,
views, and desires.
C. Public Hearings and One-Way Participation
In 1974, the Community Development Block Grant program ("CDBG") replaced the Model Cities and other categorical
grant programs. 71 Instead, CDBG provided block grant funding to all eligible cities to engage in an extensive list of general
activities related to remedying urban decay.72 This program
also had the dubious distinction of replacing the strong participatory mandates of the Great Society era with minimal citizen
participation mechanisms. On the other hand, CDBG's relatively weak mandate has nonetheless been particularly influential in making participation part of the local scene by providing a continuous source of funds for local community development activities for metropolitan cities and urban counties. 73

See infra text accompanying notes 79-90; 92-119.
See generally Catherine Lovell, Community Development Block Grant: The
Role of Federal Requirements, PUBLIUS (Summer 1983).
72 The Act lists twenty-five activities eligible for CDBG funds, a number of
which are specifically geared toward economic development. 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)
(2000). For an in-depth discussion of the effectiveness of CDBG as an economic
development program, see generally Howells, supra note 9.
73 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
tit. I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1974»; see also DENNIS R.
JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 227
(2d ed. 1998). CDBG is an entitlement program that awards funds to eligible
70

71
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CDBG, at least on the face of the statute, states that community participation is an integral aspect of the program's
vision and requirements for local planning and decision-making with respect to CDBG dollars. The statute program conditions the annual award and use of CDBG funds on city goverI).ments providing a detailed citizen participation plan.74 The
plan is required to encourage participation "by persons of low
and moderate income who are residents of slum and blight areas."75 As stated above, the federal government's participatory
mandates have been instrumental in encouraging local governments to institutionalize practices geared towards soliciting
citizen participation. The availability of CDBG funding for
neighborhood development activities is credited with having
led to a "concomitant growth in the number of [urban political]
groups, and the gradual increase in sympathy for them on the
part of municipal government."76 Therefore, CDBG (as well as
other federal development programs) has caused cities to become used to working with citizens and consulting with them
for their views on public development decisions. 77
jurisdictions that apply. CDBG replaced eight categorical programs that required
jurisdictions to compete for funding that could be used only for the explicit purposes outlined in the programs: Model Cities; Open Space, Urban Beautification and
Historic Preservation Grants; Public Facility Loans, and Water and Sewer and
Neighborhood Facilities Grants. Charles E. Connerly & Y. Thomas Liou, Community Development Block Grant, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 10, at
64.
74 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 570.303 (2000). See Jerry L. Mashaw &
Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of
Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POLY REv. 297, 306 (1996). Mashaw and Dylan
argued that the block grant format generally arises during Republican administrations and only gives an illusion of local discretion. Id. at 318-24. They further
argued that block grants come with a list of restrictions on the use of funds and
that the citizen participation requirement is an example of one of those federal restrictions. Id. at 324. ("Thus, it is hardly accurate to think of the states (or localities) being completely 'free' within a particular policy area to spend in anyway
they see fit.").
75 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(A).
76 Robert J. Chaskin & Ali Abunimah, A View from the City: Local Government
Perspectives on Neighborhood-Based Governance in Community-Building Initiatives,
21 J. OF URB. AFF. 57, 68 (1999).
77 Id. In 1995, as part of a consolidation of applications for a variety of block
grant funds, HUD amended the administrative regulations governing community
participation in CDBG. The citizen participation plan is now explicitly required to
provide for and encourage citizen participation in specified stages of the planning
process. 24 C.F.R. § 91.105(a)(2) (2000). Most significantly, the city must consider
any comments of citizens received in writing, or orally at the public hearings, and
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Notwithstanding the quietly influential role this program
has played, the participatory mandate in the CDBG program
provides for a very limited form of participation. Adopted in
the wake of the Model Cities and Community Action era (during the Nixon era of the New Federalism), for nearly twenty
years the CDBG statute merely required public hearings and
notice. Cities have only to conduct public hearings to obtain
citizen views to obtain CDBG funding. 78 The CDBG statute
was vague about recommended procedures for these hearings,
but it required that citizens be provided "with reasonable and
timely access to local meetings, information, and records relating to the [city's] proposed use of funds."79
CDBG's limited community participation provisions led to
relatively minimal forms of citizen participation. Numerous
lawsuits claiming the inadequacy of community participation
provisions have been brought but have been uniformly unsuccessful. Instead, courts typically have found that the statutory
language provided near-absolute discretion to the cities in
utilizing minimal citizen participation schemes that were subject to minimal, if any, oversight by HUD. For example, a
participatory scheme providing merely an advisory role for
citizens was consistent with the dictates of the statute. In City
of Miami v. Rodriguez-Quesada,80 former members of a citizen
advisory board established by Miami to facilitate citizen participation sued after an elected board was dissolved and an appointive board was installed in its place.81 The court held that
nothing in CDBG nor its regulations restricts a city in any way
from determining the manner and means of community in-

attach a summary of these views, including those not accepted and the reasons
therefore, to the final consolidated plan. Id. at § 91.105(b)(5). In some ways, these
changes to the CDBG participatory regulations are a noteworthy improvement by
requiring the cities to provide an explanation and justification for its funding decisions. Nevertheless, they still only allow one-way communication of information to
the public; any response of approval or disapproval by the community need not
impact the fmal outcome of the decision.
78 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(D).
79 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(B).
80 388 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
81 This case also demonstrates that the motives may not always be pure in
community participation. According to the record, the City took this action because
the Board had not provided an opportunity for residents to voice their opinions
and had alienated resident participation within the area. Id. at 259.
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put. 82 According to the court, "the Act requires community
input; however, this input is advisory in nature."83
Even where public hearings allowed only for minimal time
to testify, and thus provided inadequate time to present different suggestions for budget allocation decisions, the participatory structure was upheld. In Broaden u. Harns,84 community
organizations representing low-income minority residents
sought to enjoin the CDBG program in Pittsburgh, charging
that the program allocations for public works and recreation
failed to allocate sufficient resources to the needs of low income families and renters, and that citizens were only granted
five minutes at the public hearings to give their views on fund
allocations. The court held that the standard of what was adequate citizen participation was based on whether the city certifies it to be adequate.85 Pittsburgh exceeded the minimum requirement of holding two hearings by also mailing letters to
concerned individuals and groups and by holding public workshops to explain the scope of the Act prior to submitting each
application.
Similarly, in N.A.A.C.P. u. Hills,86 a Santa Rosa, California program was challenged because it failed to provide funds
for low- and moderate-income housing and included inadequate
opportunities for citizen participation in the development of
Santa Rosa's plan. The court decided that the plan was adequate because the application had been considered by an advisory commission and because four public hearings (~everal of
which were attended by only a few persons but one of which
was attended by over 100 persons) provided citizens with sufficient opportunities to make their views known. 87
Id.
Id.
84 451 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
85 Id. at 1225.
86 412 F. Supp. 102 <N.D. Cal. 1976).
87 Id. at 111-12; see also ffister County Cmty. Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig,
402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Koenig, a community-based corporation sued
to enjoin CDBG charging, inter alia, that the city had failed to comply with the
citizen participation requirements. Id. at 990. The court held that the city had
complied with the requirement by appointing members of a Community Development Advisory Council and by holding two public hearings attended by 150 persons that included distribution of HUD rules and regulations showing the range of
eligible activities under HCDA. Id. at 989-90. Newspaper reports of each step of
the application process and the city's proposals for use of the money ensured that
82

83
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The preceding cases were decided correctly by the various
courts. Although the legislative history is silent, it seems safe
to assume that the legislation for CDBG following, as it did, on
the heels of the Great Society program participation experience, was intentionally weakened to provide for minimal forms
of citizen participation. It was drafted to fulfill the vision of
planning as being a technical, expert-driven process that ultimately should be controlled by local government decision-makers. Citizens would have a say, but they would not have any
ability to see that their voice actually had an impact on CDGB
project priorities and spending decisions.
1. Political Federalism and Federal Deference
In addition to the minimal participation envisioned by the
program, CDBG also excluded any federal agency, including
HUD, from exercising substantive oversight over the nature
and effectiveness of the citizen participation program. This in
effect meant that citizens would not have the right to appeal to
a higher authority if the city did not provide a meaningful
participatory process or was unresponsive to citizen views
aired at pubic meetings. In fact, a city is able to satisfy the
CDBG participatory scheme requirement merely by its own
certification that it had complied. In Nickols v. Pierce,88 in response to a challenge to a community participation plan, the
court found that HUD was not required to conduct an independent investigation to ascertain whether an applicant had actually complied with the citizen participation requirements for
the preapplication or application. 89 Rather, HUD was permitted to rely upon the certification or assurance provided by the
applicant.90 Therefore, the view of participation during the
CDBG era was" that participation should largely be passively
receptive of information with citizen opinions merely advisory.

the public was adequately informed. Id. at 990.
88 556 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
89 Id. at 1295.
90 Other difficulties included standing. See generally George D. Brown, Federal
Funds and Federal Courts-Community Development Litigation as a Testing
Ground for the New Law of Standing, 21 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1980); Janet Varon,
Passing The Bucks: Procedural Protections Under Federal Block Grants, 18 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (1983).
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Accordingly, courts would not interfere to ensure that the feedback was either effective or taken into account in city decisionmaking about the distribution of CDBG funds. As a concession
to political federalism or comity principles, HUD would not
intervene in the substantive participatory decisions made at
the local level. The Model Cities and Community Action experiences left a hard-forgotten lesson that disrupting or altering
local political relationships was politically costly.

D. Front-Loading Enforcement: Mandating Participation for
Eligibility
The discussion thus far has painted a picture of an ebb
and flow of participatory structures in development. Weak
participation structures in the urban renewal era were followed by strong participatory structures in the Great Society
programs, which were then followed by the weak participation
of the CDBG era. Accordingly, the more recent participatory
structures mandated in federal development programs (e.g.,
the Empowerment Zone program) contain what appear to be
textually strong participatory mechanisms reminiscent of the
Community Action and Model Cities days.
The Empowerment Zone Program is an economic development program that provides tax incentives to encourage businesses to relocate to the inner city, as well as federal funding
for complementary economic development activities. In contrast to the limited nature of CDBG participatory provisions,
the Empowerment Zones community participation mandate
was structured in a way that was more strongly supportive of
active community participation-community participation was
built in up front as a required element for qualifying for funds
that were to be awarded to a limited number of cities. The
Empowerment Zone legislation, contained in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA"),91 included a
front-loaded enforcement mechanism for the participatory
mandate. To be designated an Empowerment Zone, cities had

91 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1397D (1994)
(amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 951-952, 111
Stat. 788, 885, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 1391 (2000»).
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to submit an application with a strategic plan for mobilizing
and coordinating state, local, private, and community resources. 92 The strategic plan had to contain a "process by which the
affected community is a full partner in the process of developing and implementing the plan and the extent to which local
institutions and organizations have contributed to the planning
process."93 Therefore, Empowerment Zones ostensibly conceived of participation in a much more substantial way. Accordingly, as an initial matter, participation was a very important aspect of qualifying for the initial round (Round I) of zone
designations. 94 As the following discussion will demonstrate,
however, it has not always been clear what exactly it means to
make an "affected community" a full partner. The exact meaning of the phrase was subject to interpretation, which cities
were inclined to interpret narrowly or minimally. Moreover,
once zone designation was made, the local political circumstances dictated the extent to which the participatory mandate
was followed during the implementation process. The overall
participatory experience in the Empowerment Zones program
was less than positive, productive or meaningful.
1. Struggles to Define and Organize Participation
During competition for Round I of Empowerment Zone
designations, each city struggled to come up with a process
that met the ambitious, but nevertheless vague, statutory
goals. 95 The principal goal seemed to be that a collection of
heads is better than one. In particular, the goal seemed to be
to allow all who had a stake in the process to benefit from the
process. Under HUD regulations, "[t]he people involved in the

26 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(A).
26 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(2)(B).
9< In 1997, Congress authorized twenty additional Empowerment Zones (fifteen
urban and five rural) eligible to receive federal tax incentives but not SSBG funds.
See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, reprinted in
1997 U.S.C.C.AN. 678 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1391). While designations were
made during 1998, they were not effective until January 1, 2000. Id.
95 See, e.g., Partnering for Empowerment (Zones), 2 EZ EXCHANGE: THE NATIONAL EMPOWERMENT ZONE QUARTERLY 1, 1-2 (Egan Urban Center, SummerlFall
1997) (noting the perplexing vagueness of the participation mandate and conflicting
signals from HUD about whether participation should come mainly from partnerships among organizations or resident participation).
92

93
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development of the strategic plan and implementation of the
components must represent all who have a stake in the future
of each designated area's neighborhoods and the larger community."96 The importance of this element was emphasized by a
checklist of questions designed to ensure collaborative compliance with this element.97
The HUD explanatory literature also suggested goals of
bottom up, popular control, reminiscent of the War on Poverty
era: "Residents decide what happens in their neighborhoods,
not federal officials in Washington."98 The assumption ap-'
pears to be that if federal officials are not involved in dictating
the details of programmatic design and implementation at the
9& U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES,
BUILDING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER, HUD-1443-CPD, at 6 (Jan. 1994). This participatory mandate evidenced three. dimensions: stakeholder theory, participatory theory, and planning theory.
97 Applicant cities were required to: (1) describe the specific groups, organizations, and individuals participating in the production of the plan and describe the
history of these groups in the community; (2) explain how participants were selected and provide evidence that the participants, taken as a whole, broadly represent
the racial, cultural, and economic diversity of the community; (3) describe the role
of the participants in the creation, development, and future implementation of the
plan; (4) identify two or three topics addressed in the plan that caused the most
serious disagreements among participants and describe how those disagreements
were resolved; (5) explain how the community participated in choosing the area to
be nominated and why the area was nominated; and (6) provide evidence that key
participants have the capacity to implement the plan. 24 C.F.R. § 597.200(d)
(1999).
The checklist provides a window into understanding the various intentions
underlying the participation requirement: element two obliquely acknowledges that
racial identity might be a factor but couches it in terms of diversity, assuming
that diversity will ensure that a wide range of views are included in the collaborative planning process. Element four suggests a process-oriented goal-that the purpose of the collaboration is process and the lessons to be learned from the expected disagreements and agreements. The element six requirement of demonstrated
capacity means that organizational expertise and ability to accomplish goals is an
important part of the collaborative participation process. This element's goal orientation would militate against a citizen-oriented, grassroots process. The difference
in emphasis between elements four and six reveal the difficulty in reconciling
participatory processes that emphasize the benefits of an ostensibly inclusive planning process that is meant to be empowering with an economic development process that emphasizes particular economic goals.
98 U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative, at http://www.hud.gov/cpdlezeclezecinit.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2001); see also U.S. DEPT OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES ToGETHER: URBAN EMPOWERMENT ZONES & ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES APPLICATION
GUIDE, HUD-1552-CPD (July 1995).
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local level, then the process would be an authentically community-controlled process. Notwithstanding the suggestion that
popular political control was the goal, this view was not reinforced with any enforcement mechanisms in the Empowerment
Zone empowerment program. While HUD retains the ability to
decommission the entire Empowerment Zone for failure to
comply with any provision of the Empowerment Zone authorizing statute, such a sanction is unlikely and disproportionately
harsh. 99
2.

Money's Influence: United Application and Divided
Participation

In terms of fostering participation, the Round I Empowerment Zones participatory process' shining hour was the application process. At that stage, the participation requirement
was an element of eligibility, and cities took these requirements relatively seriously and sponsored extensive
participatory activities. Communities held mass meetings and
formed smaller charrettes and discussion groupS.1oo Conflicts
and disagreements arising from fundamental diverging points
of view were quickly suppressed and put aside in the excitement of competing for designation. Thus, processes were open
for what were for sometimes collaborative, «visioning" planning
processes. Professional staff or consultants in New York and
Philadelphia, for example, solicited a wide range of public
input and participation to design local programs. 101 While
New York's program was ultimately the least inclusive of ordinary community residents, other cities like Baltimore and
Philadelphia outdid themselves at the application stage of the
process by using a wide base of input to construct revitalization plans. 102

99
100

See 26 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000).
See MARILYN GI'ITELL & RATHE NEWMAN, HOWARD SAMUELS STATE MANAGE-

MENT AND POLICY CENTER, EMPOWERMENT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION: COMMUNITY
PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY 7 (1998) (expanded case study of the
initial organizing phase of the Empowerment Zone participation process).
101 Marilyn Gittell & Kathe Newman, Expanding Civic Opportunity: Urban Empowerment Zones, 33 URB. AFF. REv. 530, 535 (1998).
102 ld. at 535-39.
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3. Privatized Participation and Public Competition

Following designation of Employment Zone cities, the emphasis on community representation and participation in Empowerment Zone governance changed from community involvement to organizational inclusion. Following designation, most
cities established relatively centralized governance structures,
often placing a private, non-profit corporation in charge of Zone
activities. lo3 Ideally, these management corporations would
act not only as providers of funding, but also as intervention
agents who would "change the ways in which public agencies,
private [business] firms, nonprofit organizations, and community groups interacted."104 By facilitating relationships among
the variety of local groups and organizations, "they could begin
to think of themselves as a common domain, define common
problems, and set common directions."105
It turned out, however, that federal participation and the
funding eligibility requirement in Empowerment Zones was
initially very disruptive. By creating "new catchment area
boundaries and eligibility requirements[,] ... [Empowerment
Zones] disturbed existing relations."lOG Yet existing structures
for development reasserted themselves relatively quickly. According to the Gittell and Newman study, "elite networks composed of mayors, foundation officers and development intermediaries were influential in promoting established community
development corporations as the community participants in
each city and in moving the designs for the Empowerment
Zones toward traditional business development approaches."107 Also, the goal of facilitating interaction among business, government, and community never happened. There was

103 Id. at 542. Some cities created an unincorporated operating board with Philadelphia and New York City, dividing the zone into smaller independently operating zones. Some cities (Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit) added local community
clusters along with their central boards. The local community cluster structures afforded more community and community-based organizational involvement. Atlanta
and Baltimore created citizen advisory boards that review all EZ actions. Id. at
542-43.
104 Id.
105 Howell S. Baum, Education and the Empowerment Zone: Ad Hac Development of an Interorganizational Domain, 21 J. URB. AFF. 289, 289 (June 22, 1999).
100 Id.
107 Gittell & Newman, supra note 101, at 554.

890

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 3

little contact between community organizations and businesses
investing in the Zone. Notwithstanding the presence of business representatives on the governing boards, business representatives contended that governance processes take too long
and that there is too much conflict among community representatives. lOB According to Gittell and Newman, "[n]ew businesses or businesses that expand within the Zone[] have little
incentive. .. to work with Empowerment Zone governance
boards or governance structures. Instead, they frequently bypass these organizations and go directly to the city economic
development agency."109 Gittell and Newman concluded, accurately, that businesses did not need to work with Empowerment Zone governance structures to hire zone residents or be
eligible for the tax incentives. llo
To the extent that community participation did exist,
much of that participation centered initially around discordant
and competitive struggles over representation on governance
boards. The community participation process in each city was
characterized by initial years of disorganization as a variety of
people and institutions-with a variety of goals, desires, and
motivations-struggled, argued, and fought over governance
issues within each Empowerment Zone. Each city's conflict
centered around three similar issues: (1) numeric community
representation on central boards, (2) defining or identifying
proper or authentic community representatives, and (3) fighting over whether economic development or social service programs would be the program's priority. Also, fights over decentralized or centralized control were common. The fights represented many things. To some, they reflected a necessary and
healthy process of participation and negotiation. 1l1 To others
both inside and outside of the process, the conflicts represented
the futility of including disaffected people in a sophisticated
process of problem solving. 112 Oddly, the conflict over repre-

GI'ITELL & NEWMAN, supra note 100, at 7.
Id. at 7.
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 597.200(d) (1999) (identifying two or three topics addressed in the plan that caused the most serious disagreements among participants and describing how those disagreements were resolved).
112 This argument can be discounted to the extent that participatory mechanisms usually involve the leaders of the beneficiary communities. This point also
108
109
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sentation, to some extent, brought community organizations
together in strategic alliances. According to Gittell and
Newman, however, while "the struggle for representation on
governance boards brought community organizations togetherr,] . . . the competition for money divided them."113 The often fierce competition over the allocation of resources was in
part related to turf protection. For example, city council members in Detroit and Chicago competed with community organizations for funds-the council members argued that they
should be involved in decisions affecting their districts. 114
The competition over resources also reflected a disagreement over programmatic priorities. Project selection and focus
were primarily determined by city officials or Empowerment
Zone professional staff who took charge of writing benchmarks,
thus giving themselves a decisive role in the process. ll5
Gittell notes, however, that priorities between Empowerment
Zone staff and community representatives differed. Indeed,
community representatives had a different definition of economic development from professional staff. They wanted social
services and programs that would develop "community assets
such as micro-enterprises owned by residents."116 The community view often contrasted sharply with that of Empowerment Zone professional staff members who tended to stress
recruiting established businesses to the Zone.ll7
Over time, substantial compliance with the participatory
mechanisms has decreased, become nominal, or ceased. This
may be due in part to the fact that neither the statute nor the
regulations provided any explicit enforcement mechanism other
than revocation of designation. 118 Other than a general overraises the question of whether widespread educational benefits accrue in fact to a
significant number of poor residents. See Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 11011 ("The poor, renters and minorities are insufficiently represented in neighborhood planning processes. Thus, even where neighborhood planning has been promoted as an agent of redistribution, such as the Community Action Program of
the War on Poverty, it has not lived up to its potential to produce social equity.").
113 GITrELL & NEWMAN, supra note 100, at 8.
mId. at 7.
115 Id. at 9.
116 Id. at 9-10.
117 Id.
118 26 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000) (authorizing HUD Secretary to revoke Empowerment Zone designation for failure to make progress in meeting the benchmarks set
forth in the strategic plan).
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sight by HUD, no ongoing explicit standards or requirements
applied other than the standards and benchmarks supplied by
each city's strategic plan and adopted operating structure. The
more significant reason, however, might be that the federal
incentive to make an effort to seek that participation ended
after the application process was completed. While the community was initially drawn in for purposes of being awarded designation as a zone, they were for the most part gradually
pushed to the side of the economic development component of
the program. 119 This does not mean that cities did not try to
comply with the community participation mandate, but it is
not clear that anyone ever really determined the actual goal of
community participation. And, without an overarching goal
other than community involvement, the situation became complicated and contentious. The tendency was to move the direct
community participation to the side either by having them
make no decisions or by having them make decisions on topics
marginal to the entire process of economic development. Therefore, it is useful to consider what value or purpose participation is supposed to fulfill. Perhaps a considered examination of
the possible justifications could help to make sense of why we
go through the time and bother of direct community involvement in development.

II. THEORIES OF PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT IN THREE
DIMENSIONS

In light of the tendency for weak, as well as seemingly
strong, community participatory mandates to lead to community marginalization or exclusion, why should direct community
participation exist? This Part considers the underlying theoretical arguments and justifications for such participation. Each
theory, while conceptually overlapping in its normative bases
and claims, establishes relatively distinct goals for what local
governments, individual citizens, and black communities are
supposed to get out of participation. The types of justifications

119 See generally Renee Berger, People, Power, Politics: An Assessment of Federal
Empowerment Zones: Empowerment Zones I Enterprise Communities Program, 63
PLANNmG 4 (Feb. 1997); Mitchell L. Moss, Where's the Power in Empowerment
Zone?, 5 CITY J. 76 (Spring 1995).
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for participation fall into three general normative categories:
(1) instrumental theories stemming from bureaucratic rationalism and pragmatism that answer the question of how local
governments benefit from participation, (2) democratic theories
promising self-development and transformation that answer
the question of what an individual citizen obtains from participation, and (3) empowerment or political control theories on
behalf of low-income black communities that answer the question of how a low-income black community can benefit as a
whole.
A. Local Governments and Extrinsic Theories of Participation

The first category of justifications for participation is the
most familiar and, at least on the surface, seems to make the
most sense. These justifications are instrumental arguments
that pragmatically consider participatory processes to be valuable for extrinsic reasons-for what they contribute to utilitarian goals of administrative, bureaucratic, and managerial efficiency. In other words, participation is merely a useful means
to an efficient end. Local governments use citizen participation
schemes not because of a commitment to any intrinsic values
of participation for citizens, but for their extrinsic value to
local government administration. The following discussion will
first contextualize this theoretical position within the context
of local urban development and then proceed to examine the
instrumental justifications of participation.
1.

The Backdrop to Instrumentalism: The
Imperative of Growth

Spatiali~ed

The definition of urban development has narrowed in
recent years to focus specifically on economic development. The
emphasis is now on providing business incentives and tax
abatements for business corporations to encourage them to
relocate to or remain within a particular municipality or region. As the emphasis has narrowed, however, the elite-driven
process of development has become even more attenuated. 120

Two commentators have noted:
The development and ownership of industrial properties have been trans-

120
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Local economic development is now specifically structured to
meet the high-end service, entertainment, and shopping needs
of the "global elite"-and to promote tourism to attract suburban visitors.121 Recent federal urban economic development
programs have attempted to capitalize on these trends by providing for the creation of zones within cities where federal tax
incentives and other federal funds are made available to encourage local economic development in impoverished areas.
This approach is flawed, however, because it ignores racialized
space in cities and attempts to direct development to the areas
that exist on the "wrong side" of the inner-city boundary-the
side that is racialized black and classified poor.122 Economic
development is not meant to take place on this side of the
boundary because this is the site where "the Other," or
undesirably different person, is located. Moreover, these places
carry the burden of very loaded, negative images of poverty,
crime, and danger. They and their inhabitants are places and
people to be avoided. The question that remains is whether
mandating community participation can counteract this "geography of economic development" and work to the benefit of
impoverished communities.

formed in the past few decades. Most industrial properties were once
purpose-built by the owner and subsequent user. Today, industrial space
is more likely to be built by developers acting speculatively, leasing to
users, and managing the properties as part of their portfolios.
MICHAEL A PAGANO & ANN O'M. BOWMAN, CITYSCAPES AND CAPITAL: THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 12 (1995).
121 See Robert A Beauregard & Anne Halla, The Unavoidable Incompleteness of
the City, 1997 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 327, 328 (1997) (noting "the multiple
business centers, transformed waterfronts, gentrified neighborhoods and hollowedout zones of manufacturing of the late 20th century city and the influence of an
increasingly delocalized ownership of propertY').
122 See McFarlane, supra note 7,
at 337-42; see also John O. Calmore,
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing a Stone of Hope from a
Mountain of Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1236-38 (1995) (tracing the role of
racialization and racialized space in configuring residential segregation); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1913 (1994) (demonstrating that law creates and perpetuates racially identified spaces); Alastair Bonnett, Geography, 'Race' and Whiteness:
Invisible Traditions and Current Challenges, 29 AREA 193, 199 (1997) (pointing out
that racialized space does not only refer to black space but also white space and
that white space tends to be viewed as socially transparent, normative, neutral,
banal, dull, noncontroversial, and normal).
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Economic development is carried out through a set of privatized structures and processes designed primarily, if not
exclusively, to meet the needs of business elites and to encourage capital investment in particular geographic areas to promote growth and increase land prices and rents. 123 That process is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and shielded
from public scrutiny.124 This is accomplished through elites
wielding informal channels of power, as well as quasi-private
government entities, such as public authorities, operating free
from public scrutiny. 125
Conventional wisdom" is that a measure of good city management is the extent to which it provides a hospitable environment for business. 126 The actors in the economic develop123 See JOlIN R. LoGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62, 73 (1987).
12' See MATl'HIAS STIEFEL & MARsHALL WOLFE, A VOICE FOR THE EXCLUDED:
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT: UTOPIA OR NECESSITY? 10 (1994) ("The
characteristic contemporary patterns of economic growth, of modernization and of
nation-building all have strongly anti-participatory traits. . .. Societies develop
complex batteries of defenses against popular participation."); Robert A.
Beauregard, Constituting Economic Development: A Theoretical Perspective, in THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES
267 (Richard D. Bingham & Robert Mier eds., 1993) (attributing the scant critical
assessment of economic development to its "inherent sensibility, avowed pragmatism and unflinching optimism [that] overwhelm[s] intensive probing of its theoretical tendencies and ideological biases").
125 See generally RoGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) (discussing
the use of publicly unaccountable stadium authorities to finance, construct, and
operate the recently proliferating sports stadia); see also ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA.,
DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139 (1996) ("[Aluthorities are created for anti-democratic purposes-the evasion of rules that apply to government itself.").
126 See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 122, at 59 (describing the official Fantus
ranking of business climate based on taxation, labor, legislation, unemployment
compensation, scale of government, and public indebtedness and noting that a
1975 survey by the Industrial Development Research Council of corporate executives responsible for site selection decisions ranked states simply as "cooperative,"
"indifferent," or "anti-growth"); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 68 (1990). Young wrote:
Despite •.. rhetoric to the contrary, the primary beneficiary of big government • . . is private enterprise. . . . Government creates institutions
and develops policies explicitly aimed at promoting the long-term interests of capital accumulation. To this end, federal and sometimes local
government regulates the economic system through tax policy, monetary
policy, tariffs and import-export trade policies, debt spending, farm and
corporate subsidies, and regulation of its own spending levels.
Id. at 68-69.
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ment process have been labeled a "growth coalition" that works
in concert with government officials to turn each city into a
"growth machine."127 These descriptive labels arise because in
many municipalities, economic development is a process controlled by a political alliance of public officials, businessmen
(particularly those involved in property investment, development, and real estate financing), and bureaucrats. l28 Aided
by a discourse or narrative of economic development that relies
on terms like ''business-friendly,'' "public-private partnership,"
and "empowerment,,,129 the growth coalition operates to channel expressed citizen interests into a system of land-use decisions oriented towards the imperative to promote growth.130
The dominance and hegemony of the economic development narrative and the irresistible nature of its privatized
processes overshadows community perspectives about quality
of life in neighborhoods and community voices clamoring for
services. Instead, under the local economic development dis-

LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 122, at 50.
Id. at 62-85. Cities are the site where the growth coalition operates and is
therefore referred to as "the growth machine." Id. at 32-37; see also Richard C.
Feiock & James C. Clingermayer, Development Policy Choice: Four Explanations
for City Implementation of Economic Development Policies, 22 AM. REv. OF PUB.
ADMIN. 49, 60 (1992) (arguing that the building industry unions play a great role
in directing municipal resources towards economic development to protect and
provide jobs). But see Richard C. Box, Critical Theory and the Paradox of Discourse, 25 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 8 (1995) (arguing that the growth coalition
theory fails to account for differences between communities).
129 See Rob Atkinson, Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment in Contemporary British Urban Regeneration, 36 URBAN STUDIES 59, 60 (1999) ("The mere existence of an official discourse advocating empowerment and partnership is no guarantee that it will actually [take place because) the organizational contexts in
which discursive practices operate are also sites of power relationships and contestation."}.
130 See David Wilson, Metaphors, Growth Coalition Discourses and Black Poverty
Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors
used in "growth" discourse in urban development). As two commentators observed:
City development responses are path dependent: they lock in the protected interests of certain sectors of the business community as well as solution sets linked to factor costs. This limits the city's ability over time to
adjust to changing constituencies and to address emergent problems unrelated to factor-cost issues. Local institutions continue to reflect this legacy
of interests and economic growth models, particularly those articulated by
past federal programs.
Susan E. Clarke & Gary L. Gaile, Local Politics in a Global Era: Thinking Locally, Acting Globally, 551 THE .ANNALS: GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING U.S. CITY
28, 37 (David Wilson ed., May 1997) (emphasis added).
127
128
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course, a more beneficial long-term approach to providing jobs
and job training supposedly will eliminate, once and for all, the
need for social services. 131 Local government law supports
economic development as a private endeavor, immune from
public control or accountability, through the use of autonomous
public authorities that routinely handle economic development
without citizen input or influence. 132 Therefore, participation
has a heavy burden of countering marginalization of poor black
communities and residents by adequately taking into account
the intensely political and spatialized nature of the economic
development process. 133 Many believe that community input
is inconsistent and unnecessary for economic development. 134
2.

The Instrumental Value of Participation to Local
Government

Somewhat ironically, despite the intensely political,
spatialized, and privatized nature of economic development,
participation has turned out to be a useful tool for local governments. AB commentators have observed, in many if not

131 For example, at a community organizing meeting held at an elementary
school in 1996 in Baltinlore in connection with the Empowerment Zone, I recall an
elderly woman speaking up to request help to fix her home that was in disrepair.
She was dismissively informed that this process was about jobs.
132 Public authorities and special districts have been held immune from the
constitutional guarantees of one-person, one-vote, in part because they embody an
expectation of private decision-making immune from public input because they are
primarily conceived of as business enterprises. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355,
368-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 734 (1973); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 10003 (2d Cir. 1998). In the context of the Empowerment Zone, a number of early
news accounts reflected the privatized nature of local structures of economic development. See Board Officials Clash, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 1995, at 11 (reporting that a rural Empowerment Zone Board President (Rio Grande) correctly pointed out that Rio Grande EZ is a private corporation and thus was not required to
comply with Texas open meetings laws); Joseph Gerth, Chicken-Plant Opponents
Frustrated by Hearing, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, July 5, 1999, at Al (reporting that
to comply with participation requirement, rural EZ Board merely held a public
hearing in order to be eligible to use $1 million to purchase land for a chicken
processing plant).
133 See Beauregard, supra note 123, at 270 (describing economic development as
an intensely political process).
134 See Box, supra note 127, at 8 (noting that to the extent the growth coalition
controls a city, the less possible it will be for city administrators to represent the
interests of citizens who do not share the growth machine's goals).
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most cases, "cities may work with organizations for purely
instrumental purposes, as mechanisms through which to support particular kinds of activities."135 Municipalities often call
on neighborhood groups to review plans or budgets, develop
neighborhood plans, or assist in the provision of services. 136
One benefit of community input has been that it allows cities
to take into account unique needs and sensibilities of various
sub-areas. 137 Also, participation can serve as an important
vehicle for introducing a project to a proposed community,
gauging its support or opposition, and providing a forum for
civic activity on matters of immediate interest to city residents. 13s "Public officials see a benefit in working through
identifiable community leaders who can broker relationships
between them and the network of local actors unknown to
them and who can provide apparent legitimacy to government
activities in the neighborhood."139 Therefore, community participation is primarily sought for its instrumental value in
facilitating information gathering and as a political feed-back
mechanism. In other words, community participation can, to a
certain extent, promote administrative efficiency.
But local governments operate under dual pressures. With
the advent of CDBG and its participatory norm (however minimal), local governments have either felt pressured or become
accustomed to including citizen groups in public decision-making. 140 On the other hand, local governments have an ongoing

Chaskin & Abunimah, supra note 76, at 67.
Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 100.
137 Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 100.
138 See, -e.g., Frank Benest, Engaging Citizens in the Bottom Line, AM. CITY &
COUNTY (Dec. 1997) (recommending participatory annual budget process to create
public support for difficult decisions); Michele Frisby & Monica Bowman, The Future of Local Government: Involving Citizens in Community Decision-Making, 78
PUB. MGMT. at Al (Feb. 1996) (surveying proactive varieties of participatory
schemes); Rob Gurwitt, A Government That Runs on Citizen Power, GoVERNING
MAG. 48, 48-50 (Dec. 1992) (profiling local governments that use citizen participation as a way to engage and retain residents).
139 Chaskin & Abunimah, supra -note 76, at 75.
1<0 Considerations of efficiency and effectiveness do not provide easy answers to
difficult questions of how to select appropriate community representatives. "In most
cases, the relationship with a neighborhood organization may be used as a proxy
for neighborhood participation, out of a belief that the organization is well-enough
grounded in the neighborhood to carry sufficient local influence." Id. at 69. The
other question is decision-making authority. Should community groups have actual
decision-making power? Most often, local government officials "considered the
135

13<1
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obligation to try to provide efficient and effective services and
administrative processes. 141 The goal of administrative efficiency is certainly laudable, but it means that participation
that is often laborious, time-consuming, or potentially disruptive can quickly lose its appearance of efficiency.142 Is participation still justified when it involves delay or disruption? This
is an important question because it requires us to look beyond
instrumental justifications that are otherwise so appealing.143
In particular, two problems result from a purely instrumental justification for, and view of, participation. Because
economic development is privatized and elite-driven, instrumental justifications by definition mean that community members should not be included in decisions regarding economic
development because they have nothing valuable to contribute
to the decision. 144 The governmental decision-making agenda
towards economic development is predetermined, and thus,
community views or input will rarely, if ever, be useful. Therefore, instrumental justifications succeed in making community
exclusion from agenda-setting seem rational and inevitable. 145 Instrumental theories thus would apparently dictate

neighborhood's role in principally advisory terms, making clear their concerns and
priorities in ways that both inform and respond to city plans." Id. Chaskin and
Abunimah note that a few local government officials think, in contrast, "that
neighborhoods should play a more driving role and take on more direct responsibility for development planning and activity." Id.
141 See generally Gary Woller, Toward a Reconciliation of The Bureaucratic and
Democratic Ethos, 30 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 85 (1998).
U2 Richard D. Margerum, Getting Past Yes: From Capital Creation to Action, 65
J. AM. PLANNING AsSN 181, 190 (1999) ("[O)rganizations must be willing to withstand higher transaction costs. Decisions involving more consultation will require
more time, and may require more personnel and resources.").
1<3 See Brent Wall, Assessing Ethics Theories from a Democratic Viewpoint, in
ETHICAL FRONTIERS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: SEEKING NEW STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS 135 (James S. Bowman ed., 1991) (noting public
administration's lack of a "legitimate normative frame of reference for administrative action").
1« Studies have shown that participatory structures in New York City, for example, have had a net negative effect on the redistribution of wealth and power to
poor areas because the poor, renters, and people of color are insufficiently represented in participatory processes. Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 109; see
also Peter Marcuse, New York City's Community Boards: Neighborhood Policy and
its Results, in NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY AND PROGRAMMES: PAST AND PRESENT 145
(Naomi Carmon ed., 1990). See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH
OF URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993).
U5 Participatory mechanisms have been acknowledged to be more effective at
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that community not be included in economic development decision-making.
When programs like the Empowerment Zones program
force cities, at least on the surface, to seek citizen participation
in economic development decision-making, the resulting participation may still be exclusionary and not meaningful. The
harmful aspects of purely instrumental motives are obscured
by the use of seemingly methodical and objective participatory
schemes informed by stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is
often the implicit basis for conceiving and implementing citizen
participation schemes. 146 Stakeholder theory originates from
corporate managerial decision-making models that seek to
accurately describe the groups of people both inside and outside of a corporation who have a "stake" in the operations and
decisions that a corporation makes. It considers "whether corporations owe a duty of 'trusteeship' or 'responsibility' to other
social interests besides those of the shareholders."147 Stakeholder theory posits that corporate managers and shareholders
are not the only group of people whose interests a corporation's
performance can impact; instead, workers, consumers, suppliers, creditors, and local communities have a stake in corporate
decision-making. 148 The idea is that everyone who has a
stake should be brought to the corporate decision-making table
or, at the very least, their interests should be taken into consideration. Therefore, stakeholder theory is a very useful construct for deciding the question of who should participate in a
decision-making process. 149 Within the context of an urban

retaining middle-class residents within the city than they are at promoting the
interests of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Carmine Scavo, The Use of
Participative Mechanisms in Large u.s. Cities, 15 J. DRB. AFFAIRS 93, 93-109
(1993).
1<6 See Severyn T. Bruyn, The Moral Economy, 57 REv. OF SOC. ECON. 25, 27
(1999) (noting that stakeholder's theory offers a way to determine the common
good that is otherwise continuously evolving).
147 Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 21-22 (1992) ("The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, owners, employees, and local communities."); William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 66,
69-71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1997).
148 Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON
L. REv. 197, 218 (1991).
149 See William Beaver, Is the Stakeholder Model Dead? It Looks Like the People
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development planning process, the relevant stakeholders would
be local government, community-based non-profit organizations, community businesses, individual community residents,
developers, financial intermediaries, and foundation representatives. ISO
Stakeholder theory's premise of neutrality ultimately does
not necessarily lead to meaningful community participation.
Under stakeholder theory, "the decision-maker considers the
views of all constituents with a stake in the process, without
giving priority to the interests and benefits of any particular
constituency.,,151 Stakeholder theory is based on the view that
"ultimate values or ends are arbitrary and political and cannot
be determined by rational analysis and thus they must be
accepted as arbitrarily given through the political process."152
Communities are often considered one of many stakeholders in
the issues and decisions facing cities. Therefore, in the context
of development, when there are competing goals of profit, equity, economic empowerment, quality of life, or possibly other
goals, the stakeholder technique seemingly provides a rational
means of synthesizing and prioritizing goals. To that end,
stakeholder theory presumes that through discourse, a rational
outcome beneficial to the participants and the public good will
Who Hold the Shares are Still Number One in the Mind of Corporate America, 42
Bus. HORIZONS 8, 12 (1999) (arguing that the hostile takeovers, downsizing, mergers, rise in executive compensation through stock options, and the rise in institutional investors have strengthened the primacy of the shareholder and largely
rendered the stakeholder model meaningless in corporate America).
150 See Ortwin Renn et aI., Public Participation in Decision-Making: A ThreeStep Procedure, 26 POL'Y SCIS. 189, 190-91 (1993) (proposing a participatory decision-making process utilizing three forms of knowledge: (1) knowledge based on
common sense and personal experience, (2) knowledge based on technical expertise,
and (3) knowledge derived from social interests and advocacy).
151 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37,
38 (1995). Compare this theory to the approach of equity planners, who believe
the planners' role extends "beyond that of advocacy in making sure
underrepresented voices are heard to that of giving planners the specific social
responsibility of promoting redistribution where there is an imbalance of power
and resources." Catherine Ross & Nancy Green Leigh, Planning, Urban Revitalization, and the Inner City: An Exploration of Structural Racism, 14 J. OF PLANNING
LITERATURE 367, 369 (Feb. 2000). They further believe that "having a voice is not
enough. Instead specific efforts must be made to redress the imbalances of resources, opportunities, and power that contribute to the material and social inequities
experienced by racial minorities." Id. at 369-70.
152 Woller, supra note 140, at 88.
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ensue. Fundamentally, this argument is based on an assumption that all interests, when brought to the table, will be considered equally. Stakeholder theory does not adequately consider, however, that the development process is weighted towards protecting certain interests. To the extent that participants bring goals to the table that are inconsistent with the
predefined and privatized goals of development, the process
will either stop or the inconsistent goals will be discarded as
irrational, impractical, or simply undesirable. 153 Therefore,
instrumental justifications are inadequate for justifying community participation in economic development decision-making. Perhaps, however, the greatest problem for instrumental
theories in justifying participation as a goal is their over-reliance on extrinsic justifications of bureaucratic rationality that
fail to acknowledge the intrinsic value of community participation for the participants, regardless of efficient or rational
outcomes. In addition, they fail to provide any reason at all to
tolerate the messy elements of direct democracy that are implicit in any participatory mandate.

B. Democratic Political Theory and the Intrinsic Value of
Participation
The law and policy of community participation, while rhetorically ubiquitous, are largely undeveloped and inadequate.
One of the most important aspects of community participation
is that it typically involves some level of direct participation by
community members in a decision-making process. While participation of all residents of a particular community is physically impossible, and some form of representative scheme is re-

153 See Frank Fischer, Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy
Expertise: From Theoretical Inquiry to Practical Cases, 26 POL'y SCIS. 165, 169-70
(noting the mediating role that public administrators play between elites and the
mass citizenry: regardless of the personal or moral intentions, public administrators tend to buy into a system of explanations designed to accommodate the needs
of community to the structures of a larger system of domination and control). Also,
consider the case of the relationship of community groups with the Mayor of New
York City. Very real constraints have been demonstrated to operate in that arena
where participants are constrained from disagreeing or expressing an unpopular
view for fear of defunding or other punitive actions in unrelated matters. Therefore, local government retains significant power and discretion to shape the outcome of participatory processes.
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quired, all of the methods of participation utilized are based on
a very decentralized form of decision-making predicated on
garnering widespread input on decisions related to agendasetting and implementation. The direct democracy involved in
a community participation scheme is of a different qualitative
nature than the more familiar methods of direct democracy at
the national and state level (such as the initiative and referendum). Instead of an up or down vote of "yes" or "no," the nature of direct democracy in community participation is based
on the personal face-to-face form of discourse and negotiation.
In many ways, this is the most direct analogue to the New
England town meeting that often serves as the rhetorical justification for direct democracy and our normative vision of
government. 154
The rhetoric of direct democracy abounds in the justifications for both constitutional and political federalism. Power
should devolve to state and local governments to provide as
much local decision-making as possible, to let states serve as
laboratories for innovation and experimentation, and to allow
local control over decisions that are perceived to be primarily
of local concern. As Gerald Frug has argued, one of the underlying influences on judicial decision-making with respect to
issues of local government has to do with whether the court
believes that decision-making is more appropriately centralized
rather than decentralized. 15s Although Frug has identified a
tendency for courts to decide in favor of centralized decisionmaking, he probably would not argue with the assertion that
the rhetoric of local control and a defense of its benefits of
flexibility and innovation forms a strong current in Supreme
Court and other courts' jurisprudence in the recognition of a

15. For example, the New England Town Meeting is often offered as the example of direct democracy in action in North America. It meant that decisions were
made collaboratively and directly involving face-to-face discussion, negotiation and
compromise. Today's version of direct democracy, the up-or-down, yes-or-no vote at
the ballot box, is a related but quite distinct form of direct democracy. See Philip
P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLIAMETl'E L. REv. 421, 429
(1998) (noting that the consensus-based decision-making process of the New England Town Meeting has little in common with the direct democracy of statewide
ballot initiatives and referenda).
155 See generally Gerald Frog, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv.
253 (1993).
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right to local control over criminal matters, zoning, and school
finance. 15s Americans fundamentally believe, at least in the
abstract, that local government is the level of government
closest to the people and, wherever possible, that the people
should have the ability to make decisions for themselves, or at
least have their representatives, to whom they, in theory, have
the most access, make the decisions for them.
In spite of our belief in local input and control, Hannah
Arendt made the important observation that Thomas Jefferson
was concerned that the Constitution had been justified under
the rhetoric of democracy but had left little actual space for the
practice of democracy.157 According to Arendt, without the
practice of democracy, Jefferson believed that the greater democracy itself was threatened because citizens would be illtrained for public decision-making. 15s In keeping with
Jefferson's concern about the rhetorical reverence for democratic principles in the abstract, the legal jurisprudence of direct
democracy is otherwise sparse and under-developed because
democracy is nevertheless envisioned as representative democracy and participation is envisioned as voting on election
day.159 In some ways, this puts direct democracy at odds with
our predominant representative notions of democracy. As a
result, no legally recognized or protected space exists for this
form of decision-making because direct participation does not
involve a formal system of elections of representative decisionmakers.

156 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-31
(1973) (reasoning that funding disparities in Texas' school system were not constitutionally infirm especially in light of the Supreme Court tradition of deferring to
local control of education); see also Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability
of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 83, 104-113, 118-119.
157 HANNA ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 234-59 (1965).
158 [d. at 258-59.
159 See generally Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 312 (1997) (arguing that systems of lawmaking in representative
government provide constructive participatory government through electoral coercion and interest representation).
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C. The Lack of Legally-Protected Space for Direct Democracy
The system of government set forth in the United States
Constitution is described as government for and by the people.
The "people" form the touchstone for a government that is
republican or representative-a small group of citizens are
chosen by election to make public decisions, while the people
are carefully relegated to a secondary or indirect form of decision-making. 1so Democratic participation is provided for in
the right to participate in the choice of decision-makers. These
decision-makers are typically elite leaders who compete for the
votes of the non-elite. 161 Their responsiveness to the concerns
of ordinary people is ensured through the risk of loss of reelection and pressure by active interest groups in between elections. 162 Accordingly, constitutional law has focused heavily
on ensuring the fairness of representative processes to protect
political equality. Universal suffrage, freedom of expression,
and the principle of "one person one vote" are the hallmark of
the protection of the right to democratic participation.
Direct participation has been primarily described and
understood in its negative sense, however, through the wellknown warnings of James Madison. He urged ratification of
the then-proposed U.S. Constitution based on the protection
that its representative structure and system of checks and
balances would provide against the dangers and evils of direct
democracy. He wrote:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person,
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction .... Hence it is that
such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbUlence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their
lives as they have been violent in their deaths. l63

160 Carol Pateman argues that representative theories of democracy establish a
democratic ideal that is anti-democratic or anti-participation because such theories
seek systemic stability by relying on the active participation of the minority elite
and the non-participation of the apathetic, ordinary person. CAROL PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42, 104 (1970).
161 Id. at 14.
162

Id.

1&3

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961).
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From Madison's point of view, the chaos and dissension
associated with direct participation were to be avoided at any
cost. The threat they posed to private property, and thus to
liberty, were intolerable, and meant that democratic participation should be structured into a remote system of represented
government and a federal system premised upon checks and
balances. Madison's views prevailed in the structuring of the
U.S. system of government and thus were directly responsible
for the contemporary understanding that participation be
mainly representative and chiefly protective-to protect the
individual's private interests and to provide protection against
overreaching by elected leaders. 164 Most importantly,
Madison's beliefs about human nature and the perils of unchecked freedom and power were incorporated into our system
of government and into our beliefs about the potential of democracy. It is important to note that Madison's republican
notions of democracy sought to weight the democratic balance
in favor of the liberty interests of property owners. Thus, his
cautionary admonitions about the perils of direct democracy
never really addressed the impact on the liberty of those at the
bottom of the socio-economic scale. Nonetheless, because democracy is premised on equality and because guarantees of
equality are designed to guarantee human flourishing and selfactualization for all, the dangers of direct democracy do not
justify its dismissal.
The biggest push for direct democracy came from the Progressives, who at the turn of the century sought to shift political decision-making on legislation to ordinary voters. Techniques included several electoral devices such as direct primaries, proportional representation, non-partisan elections,
and the initiative, referendum, and recall. 165 The initiative,
Feferendum, and recall embody a very limited, if not crude,
form of direct democracy because they involve "yes" or "no,"
one-shot decision-making. While this is probably the most
suitable form of direct decision-making for mass participation,
it has been strongly criticized and questioned for its failure to

See PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 14.
See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why
the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L.
II;(

165

& POL'y REv. 11, 13 (1997).
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educate voters adequately about the issues, its lack of protection for minority interests against majority interests, and its
inability to correctly weigh the strength of voter concern or
relative-disinterest in a particular issue. lss
The common law jurisprudence of direct democracy, to the
extent that it exists, is primarily contained in dicta in the
areas of civil and criminal trial juries. Juries are generally
regarded as a key democratic institution of the trial system
and are considered to enhance participatory or direct democracy.167 Courts often supportively preface a discussion of a jury
trial by describing it as the one area of direct democracy in the
judicial system. 168 The jury is regarded, therefore, not as a
judicial institution but rather as a political institution. 169 The
jury is viewed as a representative of the community that legitimizes the justice system by including a representative crosssection of all members of the community in the decision-making process. As one judge has observed, "There can be no universal respect for law unless all Americans feel that it is their
law-that they have a stake in making it work.,,170 Use of the
jury has been under attack as judges and lawyers struggle over
just how active or inactive a jury should be and just how in-

166 See generally Derrick Bell, The Referendum: DemQcracy's Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of
Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REv. 434 (1998).
167 See Article, Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARv. L. REv.
1421, 1423 (May 1997) (examining the jury as a "dispute resolution mechanism, an
equitable weapon against tyranny, a legitimator of legal decisions, and an
instantiation of democracy"); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 204-06, 218-21 (1995)
(analogizing jury participation rights with voting rights). See generally Herbert J.
Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
19 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
168 See, e.g., Lirette v. Shiva Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (D. Mass. 1998)
("Our willingness as a society to drift away from the use of civil juries reflects a
failure in understanding of the jury's essential function in our American democracy. The jury system is direct democracy at work. It is, in fact, the most vital
expression of direct democracy in America. Today, it is the New England town
meeting writ large, the people themselves governing.").
169 Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "It would be a very narrow view to look
upon a jury as a mere judicial institution. . . . The jury is, above all a political
institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated."
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Henry Reeve trans., Francis
Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds., 1993).
170 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780·1860, at
27·28 (1977).

908

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 3

volved it should be in a trial. This struggle is reflected in the
increasingly common contractual waivers of right to a jury trial
in agreements with business enterpnses. l71
Notwithstanding the direct democratic threads identified
above, our legal cognizance and understanding of democratic
participation is primarily found in the right to vote. l72 Contemporary understandings of democratic participation, however, extend beyond the right to vote and recognize that decisionmaking takes place in contexts other than elections for officials, one-shot referenda, or trials. Decisions about structuring
and implementing urban development projects require more
than a one-shot vote of "yes" or "no," and instead require discourse, collaboration, conflict resolution, implementation, and
evaluation. The federal government has attempted to create a
space for this kind of decision-making for ordinary citizens that
has the potential to become a means of engaging in actual
public policy decision-making at the local or neighborhood
level. The jurisprudence of democracy, however, provides very
little, if any, guidance about how to handle legal questions
arising from the stepsister of representative democracy: Direct
democracy. Direct democracy embodied in community participation mandates presents challenges to democratic jurisprudence because it moves beyond an individual right of one person, one vote, to a collectively held, perceptible (yet precisely
undefinable) community right of participation. To tolerate
direct participation's slower and messier form of decision-making, compelling explanations of participation's intrinsic value
are required. Democratic political theory allows us to consider
the benefits to community residents of community participation, and the benefits to the cities that must sponsor it, or at

171 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1991)
(upholding use of arbitration agreements enforceable in employment agreements);
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1157-59 (11th Cir. 1999) (invalidating arbitration clause in consumer financing agreement), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 513,
522-23 (2000) (reversing based on Randolph's failure to make any showing of prohibitive costs in proceeding to arbitration).
112 See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-87 (1964) (recognizing the
constitutional guarantee of one person, one vote principle under Equal Protection
Clause). But see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1709-20 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote
involves not only the substantive function of participation but also aggregation of
hldividual preferences and governance).
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least allow it to take place. Thus, we may consider whether
these intrinsic benefits are worth the inevitable tradeoffs in
smoothness or efficiency.

D. Direct Democratic Political Theory and the Intrinsic Value
of Participation
.
Democratic political theory views direct participation as
being important for three related but distinct reasons: participation is thought to promote egalitarianism, education, and
self-transformation. First, direct citizen participation is important for its intrinsic value of promoting egalitarian principles
and human flourishing. It recognizes that human beings value
those activities and processes that allow them to grow and
develop.173 Therefore, participation is valuable for fulfilling
innate and basic human developmental needs for agency and
for living up to one's own potential. The notion of citizen participation in its most general sense derives from a democratic
concept that all people are equal in their decision-making ability and should have the right to participate in decision-making
on matters or issues that directly or indirectly concern them or
have an effect on their lives. 174 Accordingly, based on his
well-known observations of equal decision-making and selfhelp practices employed by free, white male citizens in preindustrial, 1830s America, Alexis de Tocqueville regarded decentralized government, and its attendant freedom to directly
participate in public decision-making, as an incredible producer of energy and activity in the United States. 175 In his view,
the political advantages of direct participation outweigh the
administrative advantages of more centralized government
decision-making:

173

Mark Warren, Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation, 86 AM. POL. SCI.

REv. 8, 9 (Mar. 1992).
17, Gerald Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 THE URBAN LAW.
553, 560 (1987).
175 DE TOCQUEVlLLE, supra note 168, at 261. The United States, as it then
existed, was, in de Tocqueville's view, a democratic society. He made what is now
clearly a contradictory observation: "In the United States, except for slaves, servants, and paupers supported by the towns, there is no class of persons who do
not exercise the elective franchise, and who do not indirectly contribute to make
the laws. Id. at 257.
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Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government,
but it produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable
to create; namely an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it, and
which may, however unfavorable circumstances may be, produce
wonders. 176

Central to de Tocqueville's celebration of participation was the
notion that public decision-making should incorporate pluralism and thus should be directed by multiple viewpoints, rather
than a centralized governmental entity.177
Of course, not all democratic political theories advocate
direct participation. Most democratic political theory presumes
that participation should take place at the ballot box in a republican form of government. 178 By contrast, a smaller collection of democratic theories posit that the basic, yet crucial,
process of participation is citizens themselves being involved in
priority-setting, as well as decision-making, dialogue and deliberation. 179 "Participatory politics deals with public disputes
and conflicts of interest by subjecting them to a never-ending
process of deliberation, decision, and action. "180 At the heart
of this strong democratic theory is "democratic talk," which is
more than mere speech: "It refers both to human discourse and
interaction using both language and linguistic symbols.,,181
According to Benjamin Barber, strong democratic talk serves
nine functions: it allows "the articulation of interests; bargaining and exchange; persuasion; agenda-setting; exploring mutuality; affiliation and affection; maintaining autonomy; witness
and self-expression; reformulation and re-conceptualization;

[d. at 261.62.
de Tocqueville wrote, "It is not always feasible to consult the whole people,
either directly or indirectly, in the formation of the law; but it cannot be denied
that, when this is possible, the authority of the law is greatly increased." [d. at
256; see also Ross & Leigh, supra note 150, at 368 ("Implicit in the theory of
advocacy planning is the idea of pluralism: that the planning process should be
guided by multiple viewpoints and entities, rather than by the technical staff of a
central planning agency.").
178 See generally SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA:
POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972).
179 One of the most prominent of such direct democratic theories is Barber's
theory of strong democracy. BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATO·
RY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 132 (1984).
180 [d. at 151.
181 See id. at 173.
176

177
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community-building as the creation of public interests, common
goods, and active citizens."lS2
1.

The Power of Discourse: Self-Development, SelfTransformation, and Interdependence

The major function and effect of participation for proponents of democratic theory is an educative one. l83 Direct participation provides certain educational benefits and fosters certain psychological attitudes that are valuable to the person and
to the society. Participation therefore serves as a learning
process that educates citizens with the skills needed to sustain
democracy. 1M This can be an education in how to negotiate a
political process and create a sense of political effectiveness. 1SS Under this approach, national or statewide representative institutions are an insufficient form of democracy. Such
national or statewide institutions involve "electoral competition
between elites [that] deprives non-elites of access to conditions
of their own development. "186
The educational effects of direct participation and strong
democratic talk extend beyond political effectiveness. Democratic participatory theory is premised on profound arguments
of self-development, indeed, self-transformation. Participation
is thought to foster important individual attitudes and psychological qualities that develop in spheres small enough to allow
direct participation, such as the workplace, the neighborhood,
the school board, and local government. 1S7 It promises to pro-

182 Id. at 173. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980).
183 PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 31-33.
1M See Jane Mansbridge, Does Participation Make Better Citizens?, 5 THE GoOD
SOC'y 3, 3-4 (Spring 1995) ("Participation does make better citizens. I believe it,
but I can't prove it. And neither can anyone else."); see also Karen Stenner-Day &
Mark Fischle, The Effects of Political Participation on Political Efficacy: A Simultaneous Equations Model, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 282, 302-03 (1992) (noting
the absence of studies investigating the perceptions of political participation on
individuals' perceptions of political efficacy and arguing that conventional forms of
participation, such as partisan and community activism, do serve an educative and
developmental function which mitigates against resort to extreme political behavior, but lessens confidence in the responsiveness of the political regime).
185 See PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 32.
186 Warren, supra note 172, at 9.
187 See PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 42-43; Warren, supra note 172, at 8.
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vide experiences that make people "more public-spirited, more
tolerant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests
of others, and more probing of their own interests."l88 During
a participatory process, the individual is thought to learn that
one "has to take into account wider matters than [one's] own
immediate private interests ... to gain cooperation from others, and . . . learn[] that the public and private interest are
linked. l89 Participationists conceive of people at their best
and then seek a politically institutionalized form of direct democracy "to help them become better than they are."l90
The transformational benefits of participation extend beyond the individual to the greater community and are quite
profound. Participation brings about an awareness of interdependence. 191 Moreover, participatory deliberation and action
educates people to see their common interests, and therefore,
community grows out of participation. 192 Accordingly, democratic political theory promises to further individual autonomy
through the process of dialogue, bargaining, challenge, compromise, and consensus building. 193 Autonomy develops through
interactions with other people and through learning about
their unique capacities, problems, and interests, which allows
people to "distinguish the wants, desires, and commitments
that lend coherence to their identity from the wants, desires,
and commitments that they have, perhaps uncritically, accepted from their culture and may experience as a source of unhappiness. "194

Warren, supra note 172, at 8.
PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 25.
190 BARBER, supra note 178, at 25.
191 ~[T)he participatory process ensures that although no man, or group, is master of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject to the
law." PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 27.
192 BARBER, supra note 178, at 152. According to Carol Pateman, these community building effects are premised on a basic economic equality because "there is
no disruptive division between rich and poor" as well as "the experience of participation in decision-making itself [that) attaches the individual to his society and is
instrumental in developing it into a true community." PATEMAN, supra note 159, at
27.
193 PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 12.
194 Id.
188
189
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Critiquing the Self-Transformation Basis for
Participation

There are a number of problems, however, with the
participation theory's promise of self-transformation. The first
is what types, if any, of conflicting interests are transformable
into common interests?195 While the promised benefits of participation are logically premised on social interdependency,
such interdependencies may not always be sufficient to transform conflicting interests into common or mutual interests. 19S
For example, during the organizing or participatory phase of
the Empowerment Zone program, the process illustrated that
battles of governance and priorities were, in fact, battles over
scarce goods. Only a certain number of people could participate
in the decision-making, and even with mediation of some sort,
these conflicting interests could not be transformed into common interests. 197 Therefore, participation's self-transformation thesis must more clearly delineate the different types of
interests and their differing potential for commonality, conflict,
and transformation. 19s
Another shortcoming of participation theory is its advocacy
of talk and process for community building or as being universally beneficial. 199 This is problematic because process de-

195 Id. at 14; see also IRIs MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (examining the norms and conditions for
inclusive democratic communication under circumstances of structural inequality
and cultural difference).
196 PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 14. Clearly, social interdependencies do not
necessarily reflect mutual interests. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 162,
at 77; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY xiv (John Grayed., 1991) (noting that
democratic society does not always protect individual and minority liberty and that
the people have many conflicting interests, faiths, and beliefs).
191 Warren, supra note 172, at 14 (arguing that impersonal mechanisms like
mediation rather than transformation are called for).
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 162, at 133. Madison wrote:
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government,
have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly
'equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their
passions. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises
the cure for which we are seeking.
Id.
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pends on context. Participation theory could be enhanced if it
could account for the different types of settings in which successful consensus building and decision-making take place. 200
Consider: Can the mass participation community meeting,
where everyone is welcome to participate, be equated with the
types of places where participatory decision-making successfully takes place? For example, in settings such as voluntary
organizations, school, the workplace, friendship, child rearing,
and other consensual settings, conflict may be the exception
rather than the rule, and when conflict does arise, it may be
resolved simply by reaffirming common interests. 201 Participatory theory resonates with us because we know these transformations can and do happen, at least on an individual level.
The types of settings are usually ones where trust has formed,
and a desire to preserve relationships exists, and therefore, the
setting makes agreement on a common goal or purpose possible. No one has quite figured out, however, how to mandate
creation of these institutions of trust that will allow such
transformations to take place. Therefore, where these and
other commonalities have not been established, and where the
setting is other than the ones described above, social relations
are still inherently political with little possibility of remedy.
3.

Participation Theory's Marginalization of Subordinated Identities and Difference

Differences in race and class also lessen strong
democracy's self-transformation promise. Resulting differences
in positional and status goods such as access to jobs, housing,
and education, also affect participation's ability to meet its
self-transformation promise.202 Dialogue under these circumstances may heighten conflict by highlighting injustices and
differences in class, culture, and identity.203 For example,

200 Jane Mansbridge, Unitary & Adversary: The Two Forms of Democracy, 7 IN
CONTEXT 10 1984, available at Context Institute, http://www.context.orglICLIBIIC07lMansbridg.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (arguing that it is important to
distinguish between the democracy of friends based on equal respect and the democracy of citizens based on equal rights).
201 Warren, supra note 172, at 14.
202 ld.
203 See generally Howell S. Baum, Ethical Behavior is Extraordinary Behavior;
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case studies illustrate the tension between race and class in
planning.204 Direct democratic participation may also fail in
traversing these differences and in building community in a
smaller context. Jane Mansbridge, in particular, has critiqued
the community building rationale as a justification for participation, arguing that her research showed that small communities tend to operate by norms that silence those who disagree
and encourage agreement to preserve social ties, even where
there is legitimate reason for disagreement. 205
4. The Limits of Discourse and Participation
Participation's reliance on argument or discourse is also
problematic. Providing a mechanism for presenting a variety of
viewpoints through the medium of argument assumes that the
best viewpoint will be adopted once the viewpoints are offered
for consideration. 206 But discourse usually marginalizes those
who do not talk or those who talk in marginalized ways. For
example, an ethnographic study of a rural planning process
found that farmers trying to oppose development were
marginalized in the process because of their discursive
styles.207 In particular, dominant organizational, ideological,
and discursive forms predominated and dis empowered ordinary
citizens in public meetings. For instance, local conventions for
decision-making on land uses were personal, ad hoc, individualistic, and moralistic, and advocated granting special consider-

It's the Same as All Other Behavior, 64 J. AM. PLAN. AsSN 411 (Sept. 1998).
2~ Ross & Leigh, supra note 150, at 372-77 (discussing role of race and class in
zoning, brownfield redevelopment, and thwarted mass transportation systems).
205 Mansbridge, supra note 181, at 166-71.
20(; Two commentators note, however, that there is a difference between supporters and opponents of a particular decision. See Lee Clarke & William R.
Freudenburg, Rhetoric, Reform, and Risk: Public Participation in Policy Decisions,
30 SOC'V 78, 79 (1993). Supporters make up their minds early in the process and
are uninterested in new information. Opponents actively search for new information because they are interested only in supporting their position. Id. at 79-80.
Therefore, the best viewpoint is not necessarily adopted. Instead opponents are
likely to have the upper hand because argument becomes the medium through
which they advance their interests. Id. at 81. This notion of supporters and opponents reveals another grave shortcoming of direct democracy in the context of
today's society. Id. at 82.
207 Warren, supra note 172, at 15. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BmTH OF THE PRIsON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
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ations to individuals for personal reasons. 20B This contrasted
sharply with the bureaucratic rationality of public officials,
developers, and attorneys, which emphasized consistent enforcement of a comprehensive plan-bureaucratic treatment of
all persons according to the same rules. 209 Local residents
whose interests development threatened most-local farmers
and ranchers whose lands would be strip-mined-tended to use
the local style so that their voices systematically carried less
weight in the formal planning process. 210 This happens because the views of the marginalized threaten to transform the
entire discourse from its pre-determined ends-i.e., if one actually allowed them to participate, they might transform the
whole agenda. So, if participation theory really could come up
with a model that could take into account the views of the
people who were marginalized, the promised transformation
would indeed be authentic and profound, but the transformation would not be self-transformation but rather outer transformation of the processes and circumstances that affect their
lives.

E. Are We Ready to Embrace Conflict?
The self-transformation promise of democratic participatory theory is based on human nature at its best and embraces
conflict without acknowledging our extreme discomfort with
conflict. As a result, the promise of self-transformation fails to
provide a sustainable justification for inclusion of poor black
community residents in an expert-driven process like development, particularly when it slows down the process and injects
dissension, uncertainty, or views and ideas that are otherwise
considered marginal. Participation is ill-equipped to cope with
the real or perceived differences between people. People's inter-

208 Caroline S. Tauxe, Marginalizing Public Participation in Local Planning: An
Ethnographic Account, 61 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 471, 473-74 (Sept. 1995).
209 See id. at 477.
210 Tauxe notes that "throughout this planning process, both developers and
government agents publicly hailed the ideal of citizen and community participation
in impact mitigation and development planning, while the legal and procedural
apparatus . . . and the cultural predisposition of local elites to support changes
they associated with 'progress,' in combination, prevented such participation from
posing any serious threat to the developers' plans." [d. at 475.
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ests may not always make talk satisfying, useful, or meaningful as a justification for direct participation. In many senses,
participation is based to a certain extent on an embrace of
conflict because it believes that conflict can be resolved
through dialogue and negotiation.
On the other hand, direct participation reveals conflict
that leads to a profound sense of social disruption that people
try to avoid. As the Model Cities and Empowerment Zones
participatory experience demonstrated, the specter of delay,
dissension, and chaos is appropriately associated with participation. It is important to consider that "people care deeply
about social disruption." As one commentator has observed,
"Social disruptions concerning community structure and ethos,
hopes and expectations for family futures, institutional legitimacy, and collective responsibility are hard to measure for two
reasons. First, they yield no body counts and, second, however
valuable, markets have trouble pricing them." Participation
theory provides no guidance to government or policymakers on
how to appropriately gauge or balance the need for conflict and
the concerns of those who dislike it. The tendency, perhaps
understandable, is usually to avoid it.
Adding to the cautionary impact of Madison's perspective,
our privatized notions of economic matters, our private lives,
and our distrust of non-expert decision-making are also so
ingrained and so rooted in fear of "the Other" that we are unable to acknowledge it aloud, let alone to ourselves. Therefore,
we are left with near-universal generalized support for participation but little stomach for what it takes to follow through on
that support. As a result, many participatory schemes are
either too broad or too narrow, implemented too late, or required to take place so rapidly that they are doomed to be
ineffective, alienating, and counter-productive. Instrumental
theories are similarly, if not more so, unsatisfying. Not only
does participation as a means to an end use people as tools in
a misleading way, it assumes that government can employ
neutral tactics and obtain a fair result even in the face of significant hierarchies of power. These power arrangements promise to always resolve conflicts of interests against the interests
and desires of poor community residents. Therefore, a theoretical justification for participation seems like it should have a
way to account for conflicts of interest in a way that those who
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are marginalized, those whose discourse may not always equip
them to participate to their own benefit in a participatory
process, are able to get something for their time and effort.211
In other words, participation needs a substantive justification
other than efficiency or process. It needs a basis that sets an
explicit and unapologetic goal.

F. Participation for Empowerment and Community Control
Another set of arguments in favor of participation justify
citizen or community involvement as a means to political and
economic empowerment. These arguments believe that without
power to make decisions, participation is a meaningless exercise that does not result in any tangible benefits to the community. Here, the argument for participation is explicitly connected to a concept of justice and political efficacy that, taken to its
natural ends, explicitly seeks decision-making power for a
particular community.
This argument was most strongly advocated during the
1960s and 1970s, following the gains of the Civil Rights Movement in the South and the frustration in Northern city ghettos
that civil rights had left no impact on the conditions of discrimination, segregation, and poverty.212 Under this view, participation is a group right carried out by individuals on behalf
of the groUp.213 Political control under the era's rubric of
Black Power for black ghetto communities was an overt goal of

211
212

Box, supra note 127, at 15.
See CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 65-66. See generally LAWRENCE J. HANKS,

THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THREE GEORGIA COUNTIES
(1987); see also RICHARD A. KEISER, SUBORDINATION OR EMPOWERMENT? AFRICANAMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN POLITICAL POWER 5-7
(1993). Keiser wrote:
Empowerment is a process by which a minority group or representatives
of that minority group gain a greater ability to influence political outcomes in favor of the minority group. . . . [This) can be measured by
analyzing the minority group's success in capturing important offices,
instituting policies that are high on the group's agenda and meeting
resistance from established groups, [while) securing miscellaneous benefits
that other groups also desire.
[d. at 6-7.
213 See generally Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36
STAN. L. REv. 923 (1984) (describing a typology of individualist versus organicist
theories).
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black communities, activists, and public intellectuals. 214
Black Power as a theme for the black movement departed from
the integrationist ideal of the Civil Rights Movement and emphasized instead "the autonomy of the black ghetto as a basis
of cultural identity, social and political organization, and power
for blacks."215 While the Black Power movement theoretically
sought a fundamental reordering or redefinition of social and
economic structures to end racial and economic subordination,
the dominant energy of the movement was directed towards
attempting to "maximize the political clout of blacks within the
existing structures [rather than] redefining and recreating
those structures themselves. "216 Empowerment was conceived
of in a way that extended beyond mere inclusion of the poor:
instead, empowerment ideally meant that a community would
have control of all governmental dollars spent on behalf of the
community. This position was influenced in part by the existence of the Community Action, and later by the Model Cities
programs that channeled some of the political struggles into
struggles for control and composition of managing boards. This
claim was also shaped, in part, by the unresponsiveness of
municipal bureaucracies to the interests, concerns, and needs
of inner-city black communities. Therefore, the black power
theme was a call for municipal reform through devolution of
power to neighborhoods to make decisions on its own behalf.

21< Arnstein, supra note 1, at 335, 336; see also JOHN T. MCCARTNEY, BLACK
POWER IDEOLOGIES: AN ESSAY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. ch. 7
(1992) (discussing belief that black progress depends upon blacks controlling their
own destiny). It continues to have resonance for some critical race theorists as
well. See, e.g., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go
BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 22-23, 101-02 (1997) (arguing
that the original concept of affirmative action was community control over governmental and economic resources spent for or within black communities); Gary
Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 792-93 (illustrating the Black
Power claim by favorably distinguishing a formal demand for racial and geographic
separatism from the call to nationalism) Peller argues that the exclusion of a
nationalist approach to racial justice from mainstream discourse has been a cultural and political mistake that has constrained the boundaries of racial politics.
Peller, supra, at 793.
21S CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 66-67.
210 JAMES JENNINGS, THE POLITICS OF BLACK EMPOWERMENT 38, 102 (1992).
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Ranking Participatory Methods: The "Ladder of
Participation"

In the late 1960s, Sherry Arnstein217 devised an influential model of participation that appeared to echo the claims for
black power. Writing on behalf of "have-not blacks, MexicanAmericans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos and whites," her
model divided the different forms that participation most often
used in federal social programs at the time according to a continuum of involvement she termed a "ladder of participation.,,21s The "ladder" evaluated and ranked participatory
mechanisms based on the type and degree of participation as
"non-participation," "token participation," and "citizen power."
In the model, the lowest rungs of the ladder of participation
were assigned to forms of non-participation described as
manipulation,219 therapy,220 and informing. 221 These all in217 Arnstein had been a consultant to federal agencies wrestling with new strategies for citizen participation and, at the time of publication of her article, was
chief citizen participation advisor to the Model Cities Administration. Arnstein,
supra note 1, at 335.
218 Arnstein acknowledged that there could have been 150 rungs to properly
account for the actual variety of participation. Id. at 340.
219 Arnstein's example of manipulation is organizing a rubber-stamp advisory
committee when a few representatives of the poor are placed on public boards;
this is token or meaningless participation. Id. Arnstein was probably referring to
urban renewal.
220 During the 1960s and early 1970s, a popular social work approach to participation was to offer therapy to poor black residents to cure them of pathologies
that prevented them from adapting to their environment and perpetuated their
social and material degradation. See, e.g., Shanti K Khinduka, Community Development: Potentials and Limitations, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 396 (Roland L. Warren & Larry Lyon eds., 5th ed. 1988) (defining community development as, among other things, a process of attempting to "educate and
motivate people for self-help" as well as "enable people to establish and maintain
cooperative and harmonious relationships").
This now discredited approach sounds similar to contemporary justifications of
community development that view therapeutic approaches as a predicate for collective action to improve communities. See Patricia A Wilson, Empowerment: Community Economic Development from the Inside Out, 33 URBAN STUD. 617, 622
(1996). Such approaches may be theoretically right, but, in application, the paternalistic emphases are apparent. Conditions of poverty are merely seen as individual limitations and failure and not as a rational reaction to the deprivations and
conditions under which some people are forced to live.
This self-help approach becomes even more problematic when it becomes part
of a government program. For example, Paolo Friere is credited with the concept
of liberatory education and conscientization for Latin American peasants. See generally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 137-38 (Myra Bergman Ramos
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volved forms of one-way or instrumental communication in
which government sought participants' views or attempted to
act upon citizens without giving them a real voice. She assigned "token" forms of participation-consultation222 or what
Arnstein termed as placation-to the middle tier of the ladder.223 Arnstein placed the most desirable forms of participation-those that involved exercises of "citizen power"-at the
top of the ladder. Within this preferred tier, participatory activities were ranked in order of least preference: partnership,224 delegated power,225 and citizen control. According to

trans., 1970). As a radical pedagogical tool, Friere's contributions have been invaluable. But for some reason, Friere's work has been very attractive to official governmental agencies. In the hands of these bureaucratic agencies, the liberatory and
oppositional elements of the pedagogical project have been lost in a routinization
and watering down of the pedagogy until it looks curiously like therapy. See
Thomas Heaney, Freirean Literacy in North America: The Community-Based Education Movement (June 20, 1995), available at National-Louis University, Thresholds in Education, http://nlu.nl.eduiacelResourcesIDocumentslFreireIssues.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2001) (arguing same).
221 Informing as participation is self-explanatory-citizens are told of their rights
and options. Obviously, information can be an important first step in participation,
but if nothing else follows, such participation is of limited value. Arnstein, supra
note 1, at 343.
222 Consultation-citizen ideas are solicited through surveys, neighborhood meetings, and public hearings. Arnstein, supra note 1, at 344. For example, community
members in a Baltimore neighborhood complained to the author of being asked
regularly for letters of support for projects in their neighborhood even though they
had no input in the planning or design. Obtaining residents' signatures on letters
of support allowed developers to say the community played a role.
Yet, Arnstein's dismissal of consultation is a bit overstated to the extent she
ignores the fact that this form of participation can serve as an initial leverage
point in some circumstances. It is important, however, that she spoke so strongly
on this point because her description illustrates strongly that consultation should
never be mistaken as a preferred means of participation.
223 Arnstein's use of the term "placation" essentially explains what she means
by token participation: participation is merely for purposes of releasing a potential
pressure valve of political opposition by providing a limited and truncated role for
poor black citizens. Id. at 345-46.
. 224 Partnership exists when citizens share planning and decision-making responsibilities through joint policy boards with mechanisms for resolving impasse. At
this level, power can be redistributed through negotiation between community and
decision-makers. According to Arnstein, the community often holds sufficient cards
or influence and thus is sought out by the decision-makers for negotiation. Id. at
349. Although she did not specify what influence this was, one can imagine that
ability to delay a time-sensitive project is the most likely form of influence because in land development, the old adage "time is money" is very strong.
225 "Delegated power" exists where the community has dominant decision-making
authority over a particular plan or program, and "citizen control" exists where
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Arnstein, participation was only meaningful to the extent that
it involved the following:
[T]he redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens,
presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be
deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the
have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and
policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated
and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short,
it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform
which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent soci,
ety.226

In short, participation is meaningful only to the extent that
one has the power to affect the outcom~ of the development
process.
2. The Limits of the Community Empowerment Claim
In some ways, Arnstein's insight and the quest for Black
Power must be viewed within the context out of which they
arose. The late 1960s were a period of social unrest and high
hopes for new social possibilities. An explicit claim of a need
for power made sense in many regards. Blacks had been politically disenfranchised in the cities. 227 The white exodus in the
suburbs was underway but was only beginning to alter the
balance of power in terms of voting strength.228 The impact of
local electoral districting practices on diluting minority voting
strength were beginning to be addressed. 229 Municipal gov-

participants or residents govern a program or institution, are in charge of policy
and management, and can negotiate any attempts at change by outsiders. [d. at
351.
226 [d. at 337-38. Arnstein acknowledged the overly simplified duality of dividing
the world into the haves and have-nots, but asserted that "the have-nots really do
perceive the powerful as a monolithic 'system,' and power holders actually do view
the have-nots as a sea of 'those people.' " Arnstein, supra note 1, at 339-40.
2ZI See MaRONE, supra note 30, at 191.
228 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Dele·
gations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 134 (1992)
(discussing shifts in the balance of power in southern cities when blacks began to
outnumber whites).
229 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1975)
(holding that annexation of majority white suburbs by a racially mixed city satisfies the Voting Rights Act of 1965 where the city maintains a "ward" method
voting system); Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971) (holding that municipal annexations that have the capacity to dilute black voting strength within
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ernment was notoriously unresponsive to black communities.230 Racial discrimination in housing and employment
was, for all intents and purposes, unchecked. 231 Urban renewal had destroyed black neighborhoods to such an extent that it
was nicknamed "Negro Removal." Blacks were at the mercy of
those with disproportionate power. It was clear that without
power, they would continue to be.
Outside of this context, it is easy to argue that Arnstein's
emphasis on power and control claims too much. Her notion of
empowerment seems to be premised on the notion that empowerment of one group takes place at the expense of another.
Today, it seems unrealistic to demand that government hand
over power to communities to plan and operate government
services.232 The extent to which such a claim was made within the context of the civil and social unrest during the 1960s
further limits the current viability of calling for citizen power
and control. The Civil Rights Movement, along with urban riots/rebellions, welfare rights movements, and other such movements, provided an urban social movement behind the claim
for citizen power. Today, that claim does not have the reinforcing social organization behind it. Of course, much urban activity has been channeled into neighborhood-specific, community
development corporations that have taken on a major role as
the actors at the local level that seek to fill the gaps in affordable housing and retail services. Studies have shown that
while these self-help organizations are radical in one sense
(because they are willing to take on problems in neighborhoods
that are understood in the popular urban imagination to be
beyond hope and barren of resources), they are mainly conservative in that they channel their activity into existing federal
and foundation programs.233 This fact supports Manuel

the city constitutes changes in voting practices within the scope of the Act}.
230 See MORONE, supra note 30, at 191.
231 As discussed earlier, one of the impetuses for the Gray Areas prograDl and
the Community Action prograDl was the unresponsiveness of municipal bureaucracies to the needs of poor black communities and their residents. See supra text
accompanying note 192.
232 But see Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48
DUKE L.J. 75, 77, 90-94, 96 (1998) (proposing a "block improvement district" governed by property owners to supplement city services).
233 See Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique
and an Alternative, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1, 7-8 (1997) (critiquing CDCs for ceasing to

924

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

IVol. 66: 3

Castells' observation that urban social movements fail over the
long term because once the fight is over, their energies are
turned to administrative and managerial struggles of trying to
balance the books and deliver services efficiently.234
The other limitation of the citizen power claim is its "geographical situatedness"-it locates the source of a citizen's
interest and power within the confines of his or her community. In fact, the poor black neighborhood is viewed as an autonomous, self-sustaining unit capable of articulating and protecting the interests of its residents. It equates community control
of decisions with community control of conditions within neighborhoods. 235 Therefore it treats the problems as internally,
rather than externally, driven and ignores what has happened
to these neighborhoods in the ensuing thirty-odd years. Indeed,
continued globalization has relocated manufacturing to the
southern United States and the Third World; decentralization
of the metropolitan area has taken jobs and retail services
from central cities, and last but not least, middle class and
affluent people have moved the peripheries of the metropolitan
area such that there are now new urban areas called exurbs
and other urban areas called edge cities. 236 This approach
might have had a glimmer of hope when segregation locked all
be authentically community based as they have become corporatized and staffed by
professionals from outside the community and their work is mostly technical and
administrative delivery of housing services); see also Ram A. Cnaan, NeighborhoodRepresenting Organizations: How Democratic Are They?, 1991 SOC. SERVo REV. 614,
616 (Dec. 1991) (noting the influence of the iron law of oligarchy in NROs that
leads to a discrepancy between the potential and actual level of democracy in
those organizations).
m CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 103. On a macro level, Castells also opines that
urban social movements are doomed in their quest to fight to define the meaning
of the city because they are unable to offer an alternative system of production to
capitalism. CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 103.
23S See generally, NORMAN FAINSTEIN &
SUSAN FAINSTEIN, URBAN POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS: THE SEARCH FOR POWER BY MINORITY GROUPS IN AMERICAN CITIES
(1974); JOHN HALL FISH, BLACK POWER, WHITE CONTROL: THE STRUGGLE OF THE
WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION IN CHICAGO (1973); JOI-IN REx & ROBERT MOORE, RACE,
COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT: A STUDY OF SPARKBROOK (1967). When one talks about
a community that will be affected by a particular development project, one has
hard, perhaps indeterminable, questions to answer about which is the relevant
community. For instance, who are the proper representatives of the community?
What if the representatives are often self-appointed and self-selected? These are
the exceedingly difficult questions that must be faced in designing a participatory
scheme and that are unanswered by political control theories.
236 See generally JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991).
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classes together, but not today.
The idea of the inner-city neighborhood as a politically
autonomous entity also has implications for the rest of the city.
For instance, should all neighborhoods have political control of
development and other financial decisions with respect to their
neighborhoods? Will not the more affluent neighborhoods do
better under these schemes if they are able to retain their
resources for their own needs? This has already started to take
place, to a certain extent, with the rise of home ownership
associations as a form of neighborhood organization and the
proliferation of special benefits districts that provide enhanced
services to city neighborhoods. 237 The neighborhoods that are
being left behind in these new subunits of local government
are, more often than not, the poor black neighborhoods.
Therefore, empowerment of these communities as economically
flourishing or politically powerful units does not seem to be a
viable endeavor.
3. The Subtle Logic of Empowerment Through Resistance
Arnstein's argument was more limited, however. She
sought only to move past the rhetoric supporting participation
and demonstrate that there were different levels of desirable
participation.238 She also acknowledged that the typology
overly simplified the matter and did not address the most
significant obstacles to achieving genuine levels of participation. Arnstein wrote:
On the power holders' side, they include racism, paternalism, and
resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots' side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's political and socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge-base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens' group in the face of
futility, alienation and distrust.239

In other words, Arnstein's typology sets a normative goal for
participation-citizen-power-but does not take on the task of
prescribing how to get there, particularly in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Therefore, Arnstein's typology

237
238
2311

See Ellickson, supra note 231, at 96-98.
Arnstein, supra note 1, at 339.
Id. at 340.
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has a more subtle logic that can be lost in its otherwise strong
claim that meaningful participation involves a redistribution of
power. Arnstein's typology is based on an innate understanding that participation inevitably leads to a power shift. If you
include non-elites, the non-powerful, and the non-educated in
an elite and expert-driven process like development, and structure the decision-making such that their views are taken into
account, you are in effect giving them significant power. In
fact, you threaten to disrupt the process because it is possible
that the new participants wiII claim that the agenda should be
changed in ways that it otherwise would not be. This is a significant shift in, and exercise of, power. Therefore, if we apply
Arnstein's logic today, what she seems to be saying is that
participation inevitably leads to either a shift in power or to
exclusion. And exclusion is more likely a natural or inevitable
result because a shift in power so clearly threatens to disrupt
an otherwise settled, and often privatized, process.
To better understand this argument, reconsider the case of
the AWC in Philadelphia's Model Cities Program discussed in
Romney. Romney was discussed earlier as an example of the
limits of litigation as an enforcement mechanism.24o But if we
look further into the case, it illustrates another compeIIing
point. As discussed above, the dispute in the court of appeals
was whether AWC had been improperly excluded from being
consulted on a decision on which it had a right, as the citizen
participation arm of the program, to be consulted. The court of
appeals concluded that both the City's and HUD's familiarity
with AWC's views did not excuse them from consulting with
AWC about specific major changes. The court further observed
that "the issue is not citizen veto or even approval, but citizen
participation, negotiation, and consultation in the major decisions which are made for a particular Model Cities Program."241 Local citizens were required to be consulted with
respect to changes in the city's proposed program.
One has to wonder what kind of meaningful consultation
could have taken place at that late date when AWC was finaIIy
reinstated. But the power of consultation in the context of the
Model Cities program, with a legal guarantee and the ability to

See supra Part LB.1.
m Romney II, 456 F.2d at 818.
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enforce it in court, was greater than even Arnstein acknowledged. The potential power of enforced consultation is that it
implicitly necessitates a form of disclosure by the government
entity administering the program. By virtue of this disclosure,
if citizen groups are organized, they can respond and challenge
decisions with which they do not agree or that appear disadvantageous. Therefore, the court of appeals' decision in Romney
accorded a potentially significant power to AWC when it provided legal recourse for the city's failure to comply with the
Model Cities participatory mandate. -But, by focusing only on
the issue of AWC's exclusion, the court missed the essence of
the underlying dispute. The real dispute was about the nature
of AWC's participation: what constituted meaningful participation in the context of the Model Cities program. The OEO and
HUD, in effect, interpreted meaningful participation to include
planning and consulting. One can infer that this meant that
citizens should have a role in setting the agenda, and perhaps
being consulted on the fine tuning of the agenda. By contrast,
AWC viewed participation as absolutely and necessarily involving the management of program operations. Why? Probably for
the very practical reason that AWC wanted to bring to fruition
what it had worked to conceive. Control of the operations
meant true self-reliance and empowerment-employment in a
project ostensibly designed to improve conditions in the neighborhood. This was a profitable enterprise and AWC disagreed
that they should be excluded from the benefits of supervision
and control of the operations. This underlying dimension of the
participatory dispute in Romney supports Arnstein's argument
that participation necessarily entails a redistribution of power.
While HUD's categorical exclusion of citizen participatory units
from program operations was based on fears of corruption or
self-dealing, the manner in which it chose to handle this common corporate conflict-of-interest problem242 suggests that an
implicit goal of the directive was also to limit political disruptions at the local level by having citizen participation lead to
redistribution of power to AWC.
242 The need to plan for conflicts of interests is an acknowledged issue in the
organization and operation of closely held corporations. See, e.g., Harry J.
Haynsworth, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About Drafting Documents for
Closely-Held Corporations: Special Problems of Closely-Held Corporations, Ql71
ALI-ABA 5, 8 (1988).
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4. The Intractability of Conflicting Interests
In some ways, empowerment or political control theory is
the most promising and satisfying theory because it is based
on specific social groups and pragmatically takes into account
the obstacles ordinary black people and communities face. It is
liberatory in its aspirations, as well as unabashed in its embrace of political competition. Admittedly, it suffers from some
of the same difficulties as the other justifications. In particular, it fails to provide a way to deal with conflicting interests
within communities. For example, the participants in a community participation process are usually the elites of the community. Questions remain about whether their interests are
always consistent with the very poor, who are either alienated
or busy trying to survive and thus rarely participate in community decision-making. 243
Yet political control and citizen power, while not literally
practicable or desirable, are still conceptually important for the
explicit recognition they give to the conflict of interests in the
city in general and the development process in particular. As
Castells has argued, "Cities contain two kinds of relationships
that are ultimately antagonistically interdependent: those of
production and economic accumulation and those of social
interaction and community formation. The tension between
them deeply permeates urban institutions, urban form and
urban life."m Therefore, participation in a development process can never be seen as merely discourse for discourse's sake.
Nor can we assume that bargaining and exchange will protect
all interests. Instead, meaningful participation (i.e., having a
decisive voice in favor of issues that may go against the prevailing value placed on economic development) is ultimately
participation that is really an act of resistance. It seeks to
bring a voice not to tinker with the process, but to redirect its
emphasis away from uses and developments that gentrify centrally located neighborhoods, displacing poorer residents or
channeling the resources of the city exclusively to the down243 But see Eleanor M. Novek, Communication and Community Empowerment,
11 PEACE REv. 61, 67 (1999) (discussing communication strategies used by a
grassroots leadership group in building community).
2« Janice K Tulloss, Citizen Participation in Boston's Deuelopment Policy; The
Political Economy of Participation, 30 URB. AFF. REv. 514, 514·37 (Mar. 1995).
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town business district to the detriment of neighborhoods that
could also benefit from the infusion of their fair share of resources.
CONCLUSION

Experiences with community participation have been dissatisfying for three broad reasons. First, the mandate is largely
undefined, drawing upon vaguely defined and often conflicting
rhetoric based on notions of pragmatic utilitarianism, individual self-transformation, or political control of development in
poor, often black, neighborhoods. As a result, commuItities are
given no real power to affect the outcome of development processes. Second, no real consensus on the purposes of development exists. Because community participation involves direct
democratic decision-making, we, as a society, are at best ambivalent about such participation-torn between our desire for
customer service and efficiency on the one hand, and vaguely
but strongly held egalitarian notions of the right to express
one's opinion on the other hand. Lastly, the mandates usually
fail to contain any mechanism for enforcement of participatory
requirements. Because participation is designed to include
ordinary people in an area of public decision-making-urban
economic development-that is privatized, expert-driven, and
elite-dominated, failure to provide a means of enforcement for
ordinary citizens means a community participation requirement can be rendered meaningless. As the foregoing discussion
has shown, however, meaningful or effective participation of
poor inner-city residents in the development process can only
take place when participation is properly understood not only
as a form of participatory inclusion, but also as a struggle for
redistribution of power. 245
At the beginning of this Article, I noted community
participation's radical underlying premise that ordinary people
are to be included in a legally technical and logistically complicated process, even if they are uneducated, untrained, and
poor. People who are of different classes, races, education levels, professional status, and socioeconomic backgrounds are

2<S See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS
OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1987).
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supposed to work together in an open decision-making process.
People who are interested in a neighborhood for the profit to
be made are supposed to work together with people who are
only concerned about the quality of life in the neighborhood.
Because there are competing interests that are often irreconcilable,24s a participation scheme requires justifications that extend beyond mere instrumental justifications of efficiency or
democratic justifications of the possible self-development benefits of process. The benefits to self, the understanding of others, and the benefit to local government administration come
not from the process of negotiation, but from allowing for a
real opportunity to affect the outcome of that negotiation. Adding democratic decision-making principles to the otherwise
privatized and elite-driven sphere of economic development
requires a fundamental commitment to the idea that inclusion
of the community could reorder or change the development
agenda. Therefore, a meaningful scheme of participation will
necessarily be based on a commitment to some amount of redistribution of decision-making power.
Accordingly, a meaningful participatory scheme or plan
requires three basic things. First, the community must be
included early within a decision-making process, in fact at the
agenda-setting stage of the process. This necessarily raises the
question of whether the goals of economic development are up
for discussion. We must be willing to allow community participants to broaden the definition of economic development beyond business incentives and job training to include other
human needs and services as defined by the community. Second, any meaningful community participation scheme should
include an enforcement mechanism, either in a set of sanctions
for failure to provide for meaningful citizen participation or, at
the very least, a guarantee that some level of an ability to
affect the outcome of a decision-making process is provided.

2<6 See HALPERN, supra note 31, at 90 (describing the leading proponents of the
Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Program's tendency to "believe[] that different
groups in society ultimately had the same interests but were frustrated by not
knowing how to combine their energies in a constructive process"); see also MONA
HARRINGTON, THE DREAM OF DELIVERANCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1986) (exploring in depth "the tendency to deny the reality of fundamental differences in interests among social classes, economic, and related groups, and the ways in which
that tendency constrains problem solving.").
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Third, a meaningful citizen participation scheme should allow
citizens sufficient time to get used to all of the competing interests at stake in a city, which in the economic development
context, with its sense of inevitability and constant promise of
jobs, may not always be readily apparent. One approach probably should be to institutionalize citizen participation mechanisms permanently in the form of sub-local or communitybased decision-making bodies. Local governments should not
wait for a development project to attempt to belatedly throw
together participatory institutions. The exclusionary forces and
power of dominant interests in the "growth coalition" are too
forceful to wait to attempt to redistribute decision-making
power away from these actors. This may require, however, that
local governments begin to contemplate delegating decisionmaking power on real and substantive decisions to allow community participation and education in the business of community decision-making on real decisions regularly.247
Of course, these recommendations in some ways are directed at the easy question: Why is participation important? The
harder question of how to implement participatory schemes remains unanswered. But at the very least, we cannot answer
the harder questions without at least addressing the relatively
easy ones that this Article has focused on. The answer to the
hard questions will necessarily be determined by the circumstances and context of particular places.24s

2,7 Box, supra note 127, at 16 (advocating that public administrators have an
obligation to give away knowledge and decision-making power for policy choices to
better reflect citizen desires).
248 See generally Robert Chaskin & Sunil Garg, The Issue of Governance in
Neighborhood-Based Initiatives, 32 URB. AFF. REv. 631 (1997) (discussing the difficulties and unanswered questions of how to structure community-based participatory initiatives); Joel D. Wolfe, A Defense of Participatory Democracy, 47 REv. OF
POLITICS 370 (July 1985) (discussing the problems of participation and popular
control in large-member voluntary organizations).

